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This dissertation consists of five previously published articles and
an introduction that presents the theoretical framework,
methodology,  main  arguments  and  the  common  themes  of  the
articles.  The  overall  contribution  of  the  research  is  that  it  shows
how, on one hand, the legal practices reproduce the unified citizen
subject, and how the human subject is fragmented in legal practices
on  the  other  hand.  In  other  words,  this  dissertation  focuses  in
producing ‘us’ and ‘the other’ in law.
The  first  two  articles  discuss  the  ways  in  which  ‘us’,  the  citizen
subject, is produced in law by observing how the European Court of
Human  Rights  deflects  disobedience  and  political  protests.  In  the
first article, Disobedient Subjects – Constructing the Subject, the
State  and  Religion  in  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  I
argue  that  in  the  so  called  headscarf  cases,  the  logic  of  the  legal
argumentation can be traced back to the subjectivation of the
citizen,  as  the  Court  reproduces  the  way  in  which  the  relationship
between religion and the state is entangled with the citizen
subjectivity. Moreover, my analysis shows that the Court’s approach
to  religion  depends  on  whether  religion  is  conceptualized  as  a
personal belief system, cultural tradition, or as political.
The second article, Rebels without a Cause? Civil disobedience,
Conscientious objection and the Art of Argumentation in the Case
law of the European Court of Human Rights continues the analysis
on  the  Court’s  approach  to  disobedience.  I  argue  that  the  political
challenge  posed  to  society  by  the  conscientious  objector  is
transformed in legal proceedings into a question of one’s personal
right  to  freedom  of  religion  and  belief.  It  is  interesting  that  the
Court’s  argumentation  strategy  in  the  Islamic  headscarf  cases  is
completely  opposite  to  the  argumentation  used  in  the  cases  of
conscientious objection to military service. In the headscarf cases,
the Court chooses to emphasise the headscarf as a political symbol,
whereas  it  treats  conscientious  objection  as  a  manifestation  of
personal belief. It would be perfectly plausible to reverse the two
strategies, and regard the headscarf primarily as a manifestation of
personal belief, and conscientious objection as a political statement.
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In the third article, Who Belongs? The Turkish Citizen Subject in
Turmoil,  I  continue  to  discuss  the  construction  of  the  modern
Turkish citizen subjectivity. For example, a Muslim woman wearing
a  headscarf,  a  conscientious  objector,  Kurds  struggling  to  be
recognised as an ethnic minority, and Gezi Park protestors, all pose
the  same  question  for  the  law,  as  they  challenge  the  prevailing
notion of  possible identities and aspire to shift  the limits  of  ‘us’  in
order  to  include  the  excluded,  or  to  question  the  dynamics  of
inclusion  and  exclusion  more  profoundly.  In  the  third  article,  my
analysis shifts from the European Court of Human Rights to the
different means used to challenge Turkish citizen subjectivity in
domestic courts, in cabinets of power, and in the streets of Istanbul.
The fourth and the fifth articles move on to discuss othering in
law. The fourth article, The Detainee, the Prisoner, and the
Refugee: The Dynamics of Violent Subject Production, presents my
analysis  of  the dynamics of  subject  production at  the Guantanamo
Bay detention centre, the maximum security prisons in the US, and
the European refugee camps. My main objective is to explore how
reduced legal subjectivities who are vulnerable to violence and
exploitation are produced and resisted in these sites, and how
resistance, such as hunger striking, exposes the law’s violence.
In the fifth and final article, Forever Again: How Discursive
Strategies Re-legitimate Torture in the US Senate Select
Committee’s ‘Torture Report’ and the CIA’s Response, I discuss
how responsibility for torture is deflected in two official documents,
namely in the executive summary of the report on the CIA’s use of
so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, and in the CIA’s
response to its claims. My analysis explains the discursive strategies
that  allow  torture  to  be  simultaneously  absolutely  prohibited  and
yet legally practiced.
The five articles are connected by the themes of subjectivity,
disobedience, and the law. In the introductory part, I develop these
themes further, by examining the fragmentation of the human
subject in law and observing how the theories of civil disobedience
might contribute to totalising citizen subjectivity.
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11. ‘US’ AND ‘THE OTHER’ IN LAW
On  1  December  1955,  in  Montgomery,  Alabama,  Rosa  Parks  was
riding  the  city  bus  on  her  return  home  from  work.  The  first  ten
seats of the bus were reserved for white passengers. Parks was
sitting in the first row after those ten seats, but was asked to move
to  the  back  of  the  bus  by  the  driver,  as  the  bus  became  crowded.
Parks refused, arguing that she was not sitting in a seat reserved for
whites. The police arrested Parks and took her into custody, and she
was  prosecuted  for  refusing  to  obey  the  driver’s  order.  Parks  was
active  in  the  local  National  Association  for  the  Advancement  of
Colored People (NAACP), and the subsequent outrage to her arrest
culminated  in  a  bus  boycott  to  protest  racial  discrimination.  That
famous  boycott  lasted  381  days,  during  which  Martin  Luther  King
Jr. first achieved national fame. Parks was convicted, but while her
appeal was processed, the US District Court for the region ruled in a
similar case, initiated by the disobedience of Aurelia Browder, Susie
McDonald,  Claudette  Colvin  and  Mary  Louise  Smith,  that  racial
segregation  in  public  buses  was  unconstitutional.  That  ruling  was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1956.1
* * *
In November 2015, Macedonia closed its borders to all but refugees
who  could  prove  their  being  from  Syria,  Iraq  or  Afghanistan.  To
protest  being  denied  an  individual  asylum  process,  a  group  of
refugees at the Idomeni border crossing in Greece went on a hunger
strike and sewed their mouths shut.2
1  Stacey Bredhoff, Wynell Schamel and Lee Ann Potter, ‘An Act of Courage. The Arrest
Records  of  Rosa  Parks’  (National Archives) <https://www.archives.gov/education/
lessons/rosa-parks> accessed 9 January 2017; Browder v. Gayle [1956] 142 F. Supp.
707.
2  Anealla Safdar, ‘Refugees sew lips in Greece-Macedonia border protest’ Al Jazeera (24
November 2015) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/refugees-hunger-strike-
greece-macedonia-border-151123152724415.html> accessed 9 January 2017.
2Eight  refugees  living  in  the  Calais  ‘jungle’  in  France,  sewed  their
mouths  shut  to  protest  plans  to  demolish  and  close  the  unofficial
refugee camp in the spring of 2016.3
The newspaper articles do not identify the refugees by name.
* * *
Rosa  Parks  and  other  civil  rights  activists  in  the  US  are  often
celebrated as paragon citizens whose persistence and disobedience
led  to  a  more  just  society,  ending  racial  segregation  and  securing
citizenship rights for African Americans. Civil disobedience is
widely  regarded  as  a  justifiable  form  of  political  protest  which,
despite  being  unlawful,  ultimately  remains  loyal  to  the  rule  of  law
and  the  democratic  principle.   The  protest  of  the  anonymous
refugees, on the other hand, appears irrational, and is certainly not
celebrated as a democratic way to convey a deep sense of injustice.
The  above  examples  of  disobedience  and  protest  illustrate  the
journey  I  made  when  writing  this  thesis,  beginning  from  my
interest in civil disobedience and conscientious objection, moving
on  to  explore  other  forms  of  disobedience  and  resistance,  and
finding  my way  back  to  where  I  began  –  but  with  an  entirely  new
perspective on disobedience, law, and subjectivity. While the initial
idea was to identify and analyse real-life legal cases of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, the Court) and thereby explore the
ways in which the law positions itself in relation to social and moral
questions, it soon became apparent that disobedience, in a broad
sense,  was  often  as  much  about  subjectivation  and  othering  as  it
was  about  social,  political  and  legal  change.  For  example,  the  ban
on wearing  Islamic  headscarves  in  certain  public  places  in  Turkey
(and France) – in my interpretation – was no longer simply a ban
on  religious  clothing  or  guarding  of  the  neutrality  of  the  public
realm;  it  was  also,  and  perhaps  more  importantly,  a  ban  guarding
the  fundaments  of  the  nation  by  reproducing  the good citizen
subject.  The  good  citizen was  to  reflect  a  unity  of  the  people  and
3  Oscar Quine, ‘Calais Jungle refugees sew mouths shut in protest at camp clearance’
Independent (4 March 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/
calais-jungle-refugees-sew-mouths-shut-in-protest-at-camp-clearance-
a6912806.html> accessed 9 January 2017.
3loyalty to the state. Thus, defying the ban was an act of resistance, a
way to challenge the subjectivity of  a  good citizen, and a claim for
the  right  to  define  oneself.  Similarly,  refusing  to  serve  in  the
military  could  be  regarded  not  only  as  a  claim  of  right  to  follow
one’s individual conscience, but also as a refusal to identify oneself
with the militaristic citizen subject.
Once I  began to analyse disobedience from the point of  view of
subjectivation, I began to expand my research beyond the case law
of  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights.  Simultaneously,  having
discovered  in  my  case  analysis  that  the  effects  of  legal
argumentation seep outside the legal sphere in unexpected ways, I
began  to  question  of  what  the  law does  besides  providing  answers
to legally formulated questions. These shifts in my approach led me
to explore the workings of the law outside the courtrooms.
This thesis consists of five articles, all of which discuss
subjectivation and othering in law. The overall contribution of this
research  is  that  it  shows  how,  on  one  hand,  the  legal  practices
reproduce the unified citizen subject, and how the human subject is
fragmented  in  legal  practices  on  the  other  hand.  In  other  words,
this dissertation focuses on the ways in which the law produces ‘us’
and ‘the other’. The first three articles, focusing on Turkey, explore
the  ways  in  which  the  law  reproduces  the  citizen  subject  in  ways
that deflect political protests and initiatives for change. The last two
articles,  focusing  on  Europe  and  the  USA,  address  the  law’s
othering practices.
The process of othering is here used to describe the
subjectivation  of  ‘the  other’  in  relation  to  and  as  hierarchically
inferior to ‘us’.  Foucault  is  one of  the scholars who argues that  we
constitute ourselves through excluding others.4 For Foucault, the
subject is not the pre-existing subject of knowledge and freedom,
fostered, for example, in much of legal theory. Rather, the subject is
historically contingent and discursively constituted.5 Foucault
explains  that  the  subject  is  created  as  an  observable  object  by
producing hierarchical dichotomies, which simultaneously identify
what the subject is, and differentiate it from what it is not, thus
4  Michel Foucault, ‘The Political Technology of Individuals’ in James D. Faubion (ed.)
Power. Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984 (Penguin Books 2002) 403.
5  Michel  Foucault,  ‘Truth  and  Juridical  Forms’  in  James  D.  Faubion  (ed.) Power.
Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984 (Penguin Books 2002) 3–4.
4creating a constitutive relationship between the opposites – the
sane and the mad, the healthy and the sick, the good citizen and the
criminal.6 The logic of dichotomies is othering. This means that ‘the
other’ is nothing in its own right so it only contains that which the
first  is  not.  Consequently,  the  abnormal  is  what  normal  is  not,
barbarity is what civilisation is not, animal is what human is not,
woman is what man is not, and the other is what we are not.7
The first three articles, Disobedient subjects, Rebels  without  a
cause and Who belongs, all concentrate on the construction of the
Turkish citizen subject. The reason for my interest in Turkey is that
the  birth  of  the  Turkish  citizen  is  firstly  relatively  recent,  and
secondly,  founded on a radical  eradication of  the Ottoman history,
which has resulted in a deep-rooted tension within the modern
Turkish citizen subjectivity. This tension is reflected in the ECtHR
cases,  in  the  various  ways  that  the  Turkish  authorities  have
responded  to  the  political  parties  based  on  religion  or  ethnic
identities,  in  the  conflict  with  the  Kurdish  population,  and  in  the
protests at Gezi Park in 2013. These all reflect the tension between
the  ideal  of  a  secular,  ethnically  unified  and  loyal  citizen  subject,
and the reality of religious, ethnic, and political plurality.
It  was  the  case  of Saygili and Falakaoǧlu  v.  Turkey  (No  2)8
discussed in Rebels  without  a  cause which briefly touched on the
subject of hunger striking. This sidetrack that I began to follow led
me  to  the  sites  of  maximum  security  prisons  in  the  US  (the
supermax), the Guantanamo Bay detention center, and to the
European refugee camps. Hunger striking as resistance seemed
interesting from the viewpoint of subjectivation and law; the hunger
striker seemed to speak in a language foreign to the law, and the law
incapable of grasping the hunger-striking subject. Hunger striking
as  resistance  is  something  the  law  cannot  process.  This  theme  is
discussed in the fourth article, The prisoner, the detainee, and the
refugee,  in which I  argue that  hunger striking,  among other forms
of self-harm, can be perceived as a means of maintaining one’s own
identity in the face of ‘world-destroying pain’, borrowing the words
6  Michel  Foucault,  ‘The  Subject  and  Power’  in  James  D.  Faubion  (ed.) Power. The
Essential Works of Michel Foucault (Penguin Books 2002) 326, 329; Kai Alhanen,
Käytännöt ja ajattelu Michel Foucault’n filosofiassa (Gaudeamus 2007) 21.
7  Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and ambivalence (Polity Press, 1991) 14.
8 Saygili and Falakaoǧlu v. Turkey (No  2)  App  no  38991/02  (ECtHR,  17  February
2009).
5of Robert M. Cover.9 On  the  other  hand,  the  Guantanamo  Bay
detention center, the supermax prison, and the refugee camp, are
sites of othering.
The  mirror  image  of  ‘us’  is  produced  not  only  in  the  physically
violent practices adopted in Guantanamo Bay, the supermax, and
the refugee camp, but also discursively. The report by the US Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on the CIA’s use of the so-
called enhanced interrogation techniques during the Rendition,
Detention and Interrogation Program (RDI), and the CIA’s
response  to  the  claims  made  in  the  report  are  discussed  from this
perspective in the last article, Forever again. In it, I observe
othering in discursive practices and analyse, how ‘depersonalized
persons’10 are  created  in  a  discourse  that  I  conceptualise  as  legal,
despite taking place in non-legal documents. Law, in this context, is
a discursive resource that  can and does have influence outside the
judicial practices.
This  thesis  consists  of  an  introduction  and  five  previously
published  articles,  all  addressing  subjectivation  and  othering.  The
common themes, namely the law, subjectivity, and disobedience,
are discussed and developed further in the fourth section under the
title  ‘The  stories  we  tell  ourselves’.  But  I  will  first  introduce  the
theoretical framework and the research questions, materials,
methods and the main arguments of each article.
2. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM –
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
My work draws heavily from discourse analysis,11 and  is  entirely
based on the idea of social constructionism. Having my background
in the humanities as well as in the law, constructionist approach to
9  Robert M. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986) 95 Yale L J 1601, 1604.
10  Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons
(Princeton University Press 2013) 32.
11  Discourse here means ‘a particular way of representing certain parts or aspects of the
(physical, social, psychological) world’. Norman Fairclough, Critical discourse
analysis: the critical study of language (Longman applied linguistics, 2nd ed edn
2010) 358.
6law  came  naturally  to  me.  Like  concepts  such  as  culture,  religion,
and society,  the concept of  law must be constructed anew in every
research, as it escapes and exceeds definitions; the ‘inside’ and
‘outside’, and the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’12 of  law  are  not
something pre-existing and something to be taken for granted, but
something that is constructed.13 One  of  the  aims  of  this  particular
research  is  to  observe  how  the  ways  in  which  the  ‘inside’  and
‘outside’ of law are constructed affect the extent to which the law
can  be  held  accountable  for  what  it  does:  the  law  cannot  be  held
accountable  for  all  that  it  causes,  if  the  law’s  (discursive  and
tangible)  violence is  conceptually  outsourced e.g.  to the spheres of
politics  or  force,  or  if  it  is  blamed on  erroneous  application  of  the
law.
The branch of social constructionism I identify with draws from
postmodern thinking. Pulkkinen explains the difference between
modern and postmodern: both are ‘modes of thought or cultural
attitudes’, but whereas modern attitude ‘is in search of foundation’,
which  ‘presents  a  purifying  motion  focused  on  a  basic  core’,
postmodern is ‘defined as anti-foundational’.14 Thinking in terms of
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ is typical for modern mode of thought. While it
is not possible to get rid of using dichotomous words, and while the
postmodern does not oppose dichotomies in general, the
postmodern contests the emphasis on these types of distinctions
and problematizes thinking in their terms. Pulkkinen reminds that
the  point  of  the  postmodern  is  not  to  emphasise  the  ‘surface’
instead of the ‘foundation’ (e.g. ‘gender’ over ‘sex’, or ‘nurture’ over
‘nature’15),  but  to  oppose  the  logic  of  and  emphasis  on  the
dichotomies themselves.16
12  See e.g. Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law: An Essay in Legal Theory (Oxford
University Press 2007) 5—6.
13  Constructionist approach does not take e.g. the institutional settings or social
structures as pre-given, but is interested in the ways in which they are produced in
action and speech. See e.g. Jonathan Potter and Alexa Hepburn, ‘Discursive
Constructionism’ in James A. Holstein & Jaber F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of
Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008) 289.
14  Tuija Pulkkinen, The Postmodern and Political Agency (SoPhi 1996) 37; see also Darin
Weinberg, ‘The Philosophical Foundations of Constructionist Research’ in James A.
Holstein & Jaber F.  Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford
Press 2008) 15—16.
15  See e.g. Tuija Pulkkinen, The Postmodern and Political Agency (SoPhi 1996) 144—156.
16  Tuija Pulkkinen, The Postmodern and Political Agency (SoPhi 1996) 38, 171. See also
e.g. Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and ambivalence (Polity Press 1991) 98—101;
7The  constructionist  starting  point  is  that  language  imposes
meaning and manipulates our perception; in other words language
is reality-constitutive instead of representational. Thus, social
constructionism indicates a critical stance towards taken for
granted knowledge and seemingly natural categories. Even the
categories we often perceive as natural, unquestionable, and
universal, are approached as historically and culturally contingent.
To  express  it  succinctly,  I  commit  to  the  idea  that  there  is  no
essence to things, and that which we perceive as natural or real, is a
construction.17 The  implications  for  this  are  not  only  theoretical
because knowledge and social action go together.18
Saussure’s  influence  on  social  constructionism  is  crucial.  He
asserted that the link between the signifier (the spoken sound) and
the  signified  (the  concept)  is  arbitrary,  but  further  expressed  that
the categories and the concepts themselves are arbitrary divisions
and categorisations of our experience. Thus, language profoundly
produces  and  molds  our  perceived  realities,  and  does  not  simply
reflect and reiterate it.19 Language can therefore be understood as a
site  of  meaning  production.  Departing  from  Saussure,  the
postmodern approach to language abandons the idea of language as
a fixed, albeit arbitrary, system, and embraces the idea of meaning
being incessantly contestable.20 Reality, or rather what is perceived
as reality, is therefore created by constructing meaning – meaning
in  the  sense  of  knowledge  and  truth,  not  only  as  the  relationship
between the signifier and the signified; we ‘account for, explain,
blame, make excuses, construct facts, use cultural categories, and
present  [ourselves]  to  others  in  specific  ways,  taking  the
interpretive context into account’.21 Thus,  discursive  approach
differs from speech act theory in that it considers language ‘wholly
Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical jurisprudence: the political philosophy of
justice (Hart Publishing 2005) 48; cf. Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodernity and its
discontents (Polity, 1998) 16.
17  Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality: a treatise
in the sociology of knowledge (Penguin 1971) 249.
18  Vivien Burr, Social constructionism (3rd ed edn Routledge 2015) 2–8, 18, 29.
19  Ibid 51, 46, 52.
20  Ibid 54.
21  Pirjo Nikander, ‘Constructionism and Discourse Analysis’ in James A. Holstein & Jaber
F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008) 415.
8and thoroughly performative’, instead of dealing ‘merely with
decontextualized sentences’.22
By abandoning essentialism, social constructionism also rejects
the unitary individual and insists that subjectivities are socially
constructed.23 This makes discursive, social constructionist,
approach appropriate for analysing subjectivation and othering, as
the social  relationships are not just  social  products,  but also social
processes.24
Discourse analysis approaches texts in a fundamentally different
way  than  doctrinal  legal  research.  For  a  legal  scholar  engaging  in
doctrinal  research,  the challenge is  to interpret  ‘facts’  and ‘norms’,
whereas  the  discourse  analyst  is  interested  in  the  ways  in  which
(legal) texts (and practices) produce those ‘facts’ and ‘norms’ as well
as  the  ways  in  which  they  construct  reality  in  general.25 In  this
thesis it means that the law’s constructedness is taken as a starting
point  for  inquiry  into  the  ways  in  which  the  law  produces
subjectivities in its practices. Law’s constructedness does not simply
mean  that  the  law  is  thoroughly  political  or  meshed  with  morals.
Instead the focus is on the ways in which the law is constructed in
relation to these other spheres, and for what purposes.
This thesis  explores the ways that  meaning is  produced both in
discursive and other social practices, all embedded in the legal. In
addition to language, meaning can also be produced in practices, as
not  only  words,  but  for  example  gestures  and  objects can also
convey  meaning.  An  example  of  an  object  turned  into  a  sign  is  a
knife as a ‘sign’ of violence;26 everyone knows how easy it is to only
use gestures to communicate contempt. In my analysis, I study how
22  Shi-xu, A Cultural Approach to Discourse. (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 28.
23  Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality: a treatise
in the sociology of knowledge (Penguin 1971) 149; Vivien Burr, Social constructionism
(3rd ed edn Routledge 2015) 88–103, 185–186; Mark Currie Postmodern Narrative
Theory (Macmillan Press: St. Martin's Press 1998) 104.
24  Shi-xu, A Cultural Approach to Discourse. (Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 30—31.
25  Johanna Niemi-Kiesiläinen, Päivi Honkatukia and Minna Ruuskanen, ’Legal Texts as
Discourses’ in Åsa Gunnarsson, Eva-Maria Svensson and Margaret Favies (eds.)
Exploiting the Limits of Law. Swedish Feminism and the Challenge to Pessimism
(Ashgate 2007).
26  Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality: a treatise
in the sociology of knowledge (Penguin 1971) 55; Vivien Burr, Social constructionism
(3rd  ed  edn  Routledge  2015)  186.  See  also  Norman  Fairclough, Critical discourse
analysis: the critical study of language (Longman applied linguistics, 2nd ed edn
Pearson education 2010) 952.
9subjectivities are produced and contested in non-discursive
communicative practices, such as torture. While the violent
practices  target  the  physical  body,  my  focus  is  not  on  the  bodily
experience of pain, or on the body in acts of violence and resistance.
Instead  my  argument  is  that  physical  violence,  as  well  as  words,
construct less-than-human subjectivities. The bodily subject is
produced in myriad social  practices,  some of  which are discursive,
others very tangible.27 My aim is to question matters that seem self-
evident and ask whether they could be otherwise. In this sense, my
research can be described as critical, as its aim is to identify gaps in
what the law says it does, and what it in fact does.28 However, rather
than providing answers to how these gaps can be filled, my aim is to
make visible those mechanisms of meaning making that contribute
to othering, and to make my own contribution to the methodology
for analysing legal argumentation.
While the social constructionist approach means abandoning the
search for the ‘core’ or ‘essence’ of the law, it does not free one from
defining  the  law  for  the  purposes  of  research.  For  this  reason,  I
need  to  remind  the  reader  that  my  own  work  is  also  based  on
constructions. To mention a few, these are constructions of the law,
the political and social contexts of the case law, the categorisations I
formulate regarding disobedience and subjectivities, and the
practices  of  torturing  and  martyring.   As  for  everyone  else,  the
researcher has no objective and pre-existing phenomena to use as
research material. Thus, to ask cogent, coherent and researchable
research questions, one must construct a relatively coherent object
of research.29 Fairclough cautions against taking research topics for
granted:  we  should  not  assume  that  topics  such  as  ‘terrorism’,
‘immigration’ or ‘the law’ as being obvious, pre-existing entities that
27  See e.g. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity
(Routledge 1999) 107—193;  Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in
Subjection (Stanford University Press 1997) 84—86; Judith Butler, Bodies that
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (Routledge 1993) x—12; see also Jonathan
Potter and Alexa Hepburn, ‘Discursive Constructionism’ in James A. Holstein & Jaber
F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008)
289—291;  Bryan  S.  Turner,  ‘The  Constructed  Body’  in  James  A.  Holstein  &  Jaber  F.
Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008) 500.
28  See Norman Fairclough, Critical discourse analysis: the critical study of language
(Longman applied linguistics, 2nd ed edn Pearson education 2010) 231.
29  Ibid 5.
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can  be  analysed  without  first  theorising  about  them.30 This
approach  makes  it  impossible  to  make  a  clear  division  between
theory and methodology.31 The  implications  of  my  own
constructions for the methodology of legal research are discussed in
section 5.
For  me,  and  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  law is  not  only  the
doctrine  (the  ‘inside’)  or  the  practices  of  the  ‘insiders’  (e.g.  the
judge,  the  officials,  advocates  etc.)  but  also  legal  discourses
regardless  of  the  status  of  the  person  recoursing  to  them.  For
example,  a  person  in  the  streets  in  the  midst  of  a  dispute  over
parking, yelling to another person, ‘I’ll sue you!’ can be understood
to be using the law, and therefore that which they are able to bring
into the dispute with a single reference to the law, is an example of
what  the  law  does  in  the  world.  The  law  is  not  only  used  by  legal
professionals, administrators, executives, or parties to legal
disputes; it is used everywhere and by anyone who uses legal
language and the logic of law. For example, this type of perception
resonates in Veitch’s understanding of the law. For Veitch, the law
is  not  limited  to  legal  norms  and  judicial  practices,  but  instead  he
perceives  the  social,  economic  and  political  structures  of  our
societies as being deeply embedded in the legal and influenced by it
even if not explicitly juridified.32 In other words, even the absence of
regulation does not indicate the absence of law.
The  question  of  power  is  entangled  in  the  premises  of  social
constructionism.  As  will  be  discussed  below,  the  knowledge  we
produce profoundly affects our understanding of what we think is
acceptable. For example, our understanding of the ability of other
animals  to  experience  pain  and  to  form  social  bonds,  etc.,  affects
what we consider to be an acceptable way to treat them. Similarly,
‘[w]hat  is  possible  for  one  person  to  do  to  another,  under  what
rights  and  obligations,  is  given  by  the  version  of  events  currently
taken as knowledge’.33 This Foucauldian understanding of power,
30  Ibid 235–236.
31  Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An invitation to reflexive sociology (Polity
Press 1992) xiv, 332; Norman Fairclough, Critical discourse analysis: the critical
study of language (Longman applied linguistics, 2nd ed edn Pearson education 2010)
413-414.
32  Scott Veitch, Law and irresponsibility: on the legitimation of human suffering
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 61–63, 65–66, 82, 83, 86.
33  Vivien Burr, Social constructionism (3rd ed edn Routledge 2015) 68.
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not  as  something  that  can  be  possessed,  but  as  an  effect  of
discourse, allows us to analyse our definitions and representations
from the perspective of the type of knowledge and power relations
they (re)produce.34 These ideas are developed further in section 4,
drawing from the common themes of the articles.
2.1 CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
Social constructionism has been criticized for not being able to
capture the embodied, physical reality. Some have even accused
social  constructionism  of  denying  the  existence  of  the  physical
world  altogether.  The  simple  answer  to  this  critique  is  that
constructionism  does  not  mean  denying  the  existence  of,  say,
earthquakes or falling bricks;35 instead it denies the possibility that
they could be understood outside of discourse, as if the world came
‘ready-made in categories of  events and types of  objects’.36 In fact,
social constructionism reminds that the mind-matter dichotomy
itself  is  a  construction.  I  will  not  further  address  the  question  of
what  the  ‘reality’  ‘really’  consists  of  in  the  theory  of  social
constructionism, as that topic is well covered elsewhere.37
Nonetheless,  I  do want to emphasise that  by insisting that  what is
real  to  us  is  socially  constructed,  I  do  not  mean  that  our
experiences, bodies, identities, life narratives, etc., are illusionary,
non-existent or unimportant. Following Berger and Luckmann, it
can  be  proposed  that  concept  of  the  world  being  socially
constructed and experienced as pre-given and fixed are not
34  Ibid.
35  Laclau  and  Mouffe  1985,  108  as  cited  in  Shi-xu, A Cultural Approach to Discourse.
(Palgrave Macmillan 2004) 25.
36  Vivien Burr, Social constructionism (3rd ed  edn  Routledge  2015)  89;  see  also  Sara
Mills, Discourse (Routledge 1997) 50.
37  See e.g. Joel Best, ‘Historical Development and Defining Issues of Constructionist
Inquiry’ in James A. Holstein & Jaber F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist
Research (Guilford Press 2008) 45—46; Vivien Burr, Social constructionism (3rd ed
edn Routledge 2015) 2-8, 18, 29. 88-103, 185-186; Mark Currie Postmodern Narrative
Theory (Macmillan Press: St. Martin's Press 1998) 35—36, 45—48, 89—90; Jonathan
Potter and Alexa Hepburn, ‘Discursive Constructionism’ in James A. Holstein & Jaber
F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008) 277,
287—288.
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mutually exclusive.38 Thus,  social  constructions  cannot  be  equated
with something that is false, imaginary or inauthentic.
Another  typical  critique  of  social  constructionism  and
postmodern  concerns  relativism.  This  line  of  critique  accuses
constructionism and postmodern approaches of resulting in moral
judgments  becoming  impossible  and  unfounded,  as  the  idea  of  a
coherent  subject  is  abandoned,  as  well  as  the  idea  of  universally
valid morality, or, regarding the law, inherent moral core of the law.
It can be argued, however, that a person being conceived as entirely
socially  constructed  is  not  mutually  exclusive  with  being  morally
and politically responsible judging person. Moreover, accepting the
lack of universal validity of claims of justice does not make judging
impossible or unfounded. Instead, it simply denies the possibility of
backing  one’s  judgments  up  with  claims  of  universality,  and
acknowledges  that  regarding  justice,  indisputability  cannot  be
achieved.39
Renouncing universality and the possibility of an inherent
normative  core  of  the  law  does  not  mean  that  one  cannot  have
ethical  commitments.  For  a  legal  scholar  engaging  in  doctrinal  or
jurisprudential  research  this  means  that  the  ethicality  of  law must
be constructed in the law in compliance with the legal methodology.
For  a  researcher  such  as  myself  whose  research  interests  are
empirical, questions relating to the normativity of law are not in the
focus.  Any  normative  claims  I  make  in  my  own  research  do  not
concern the correct interpretation or the ‘essence’ of the law; my
ethical commitment to values such as the equality of human beings,
however, is hopefully clear for the reader in my texts. My claims on
the question of how the law works, on the other hand, are intended
as empirical observations rather that as immanent critique. That
said,  my  work  may  contribute  to  normative  legal  research  by
making the legal argumentation more transparent, as my research
interest is making visible the way in which the subject is
38  Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social construction of reality: a treatise
in the sociology of knowledge (Penguin 1971).
39  Tuija Pulkkinen, The Postmodern and Political Agency (SoPhi  1996)  200—203;  see
also Joel Best, ‘Historical Development and Defining Issues of Constructionist Inquiry’
in James A. Holstein & Jaber F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist
Research (Guilford Press 2008) 55—56; Leslie Miller, ‘Foucauldian Constructionism’
in James A. Holstein & Jaber F. Gubrium (eds.) Handbook of Constructionist
Research (Guilford Press 2008) 267—268.
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constructed in the processes of (legal) meaning production.40 The
discourses of othering, which constitute not only ‘the other’ but ‘us’
as  well,  are  deconstructed  in  my  work  in  the  sense  that  their
constructedness and the construction processes are made
transparent.41 If the categories we use in order to make sense of the
world are contingent and do not reflect ‘the real’, dismantling those
categories inevitably changes the way we perceive things and
perhaps opens up possibilities for re-interpretation.42
The  following  section  introduces  the  main  arguments  and  the
research  methods  of  the  articles  in  more  detail.  The  first  three
articles relate to the subjectivation of  ‘us’,  the good citizen subject,
while the last two discuss othering.
3. INTRODUCTION TO THE ARTICLES
3.1. ‘US’
3.1.1 DISOBEDIENT SUBJECTS – CONSTRUCTING THE
SUBJECT, THE STATE AND RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
In Turkey, the relationship between religion and the state is tense
and entangled with citizen subjectivity. This observation led me to
consider the headscarf cases from the perspective of disobedience,
as  wearing  the  headscarf  was  not  treated  simply  as  a  personal
choice  or  an  expression  of  belief,  but  was  regarded  ultimately  as
challenging the unity of  the nation.  The cases analysed in the first
article, Disobedient subjects, were selected through a gradual
40  See Vivien Burr, Social constructionism (3rd ed edn Routledge 2015) 17.
41  See ibid 18.
42  Ibid 3; see also Susan S. Silbey, ‘A Sociological Interpretation of the Relationship
between Law and Society’ in Richard John Neuhas (ed.) Law and the Ordering of Our
Life Together (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company 1989).
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process. I was interested in the ways in which the Court approaches
and  conceptualises  Islam  in  the  cases  concerning  Turkey.  The
impetus for this interest was the obvious prejudice against Islam in
the  famous  cases  of Refah  partisi  v.  Turkey43 and Leyla  Șahin  v.
Turkey44. For example, in the Refah case, the Court identified Islam
rather straightforwardly in terms of totalitarianism and being
contrary to democracy.45
The  provisional  analysis  revealed  that  most  of  the  cases
concerning  Islam  could  be  categorised  into  three  groups:  the
headscarf cases, cases concerning education, and cases concerning
blasphemy. Further analysis indicated that religion was constructed
differently by the Court in these categories. For the headscarf cases,
the political aspects of Islam were deemed to be predominant,
whereas in the context of education, Islam was treated as a cultural
tradition.  And  in  blasphemy  cases,  Islam  was  regarded  as  a
personal  belief  system.  In  order  to  confirm  the  observation  that
religion was being conceptualised differently depending on the
context,  and  to  assess  the  alleged  Christian  bias,  I  searched  for
cases concerning Christianity for a comparison. The cases
concerning blasphemy (Otto Preminger v. Austria46; Wingrove v.
UK47; Murphy v. Ireland48)  and  education  (Folgerø v. Norway49)
confirmed that religion, be it Islam or Christianity, is
conceptualised in these contexts either as a personal  belief  or  as a
cultural tradition. However, cases concerning religious attire and
symbols (Leyla Șahin v. Turkey; Doǧru v. France50; Ahmet Arslan
v. Turkey51; S.A.S. v. Turkey52; Lautsi v. Italy53) indicate that only
the Islamic headscarf is politicised by the Court.54 According to my
analysis,  a  Christian  bias  can  be  detected  in  the  way  the  Court
43 Refah partisi (the Welfare party) and others v. Turkey ECHR 2003-II.
44 Leyla Șahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-IX.
45 Refah partisi (the Welfare party) and others v. Turkey, paras 101, 103.
46 Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria (1994) Series A no 295.
47 Wingrove v. The United Kingdom ECHR 1996-V.
48 Murphy v. Ireland ECHR 2003-IX.
49 Folgero v. Norway ECHR 2007-III.
50 Doǧru v. France App no 27058/05 (ECtHR, 4 December 2008).
51 Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey App no 41135/98 (ECtHR, 23 February 2010).
52 S.A.S. v. France ECHR 2014.
53 Lautsi and others v. Italy ECHR 2011.
54  See also Eweida and others v. The United Kingdom ECHR 2013.
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reproduces the image of political Islam in certain contexts, rather
than a pervasive and overall bias against Islam.
The  headscarf  and  full-face  veil  cases  in  the  ECtHR  are
exemplary  of  the  slickness  of  the  legal  argument.  The  Court  tries
and  repeatedly  fails  to  create  and  address  the  crux  of  the  matter,
ultimately  revealing  that  there  is  none.  This  is  obvious  from  the
inconsistent  way  the  Court  produces  crucial  ‘similarities’  and
‘differences’ between the cases. For instance, in Ahmet Arslan v.
Turkey, the Court did not find  the religious attire of the members
of Aczdimendi tarikati who wear turbans and black tunics as having
a  ‘proselytising  effect’,  while  in  the  headscarf  cases  of Doǧru v.
France and Dahlab v. Switzerland,  the  Court  did  rule  that  the
headscarf had that effect. According to the Court, this was because
the context in the latter two cases was educational rather than the
public  sphere  in  general,  as  was  the  case  in Ahmet Arslan.
Nonetheless, in Lautsi v. Italy, pursuant  to  the  Court,  a  religious
symbol did not have a proselytising effect despite the context again
being  educational.  This  was  because  the  symbol,  namely  the
crucifix, represented cultural tradition rather than religion. In the
most recent of the headscarf cases, S.A.S. v. France, the context was
the same as in the case of Ahmet Arslan, namely any public place.
This  time,  the  Court  did  not  discuss  the  potential  proselytising
effect of the full-face veil, but instead commented on the alleged
detrimental effect the veil might have for interpersonal
relationships between the people, and therefore for democracy
itself.
Both in Leyla Șahin and S.A.S., the applicant claimed that
wearing  a  headscarf  was  their  own  free  choice.  In  both  cases,  the
Court  emphasised,  following  the  governments’  argumentation,  the
way other people allegedly perceive the headscarf and the full-face
veil. In other words, the Court constructed a national context in
which  the  headscarf  was  perceived  as  a  religious  duty  imposed  on
women,  or  as  a  political  statement.  In  this  type  of  context,  Leyla
Șahin  and  the  applicant  in S.A.S. could be perceived as political
actors  irrespective  of  their  own  claims  of  what  the  headscarf
symbolised for them. My argument here is not that the meaning of a
symbol  should  be  determined  by  the  person  using  it,  but  that  the
Court actively participates in meaning making when it interprets
the meaning of  the headscarf.  Further,  as  I  observe in Disobedient
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subjects,  these  discursive  moves  allowed the  Court  to  place public
order on the legal  scales,  which would not have been possible had
the  headscarf  been  constructed  solely  in  terms  of  expression  of
personal belief. I demonstrate that while the Court’s argumentation
in each case concerning religious symbols and clothing seemingly
addresses the extent of freedom of religion, it is, in fact, entangled
in  a  whole  set  of  other  issues,  stemming  from  the  role  of  religion
within the nation state on the one hand, and the constitution of the
citizen subject on the other.
The ideas expressed above illustrate how the Court reproduces
meaning  and  participates  in  the  struggle  over  what  the  Islamic
headscarf signifies. An illustrative example of the politicisation of
the  headscarf  is  the  way  in  which  ‘the  Muslim  headscarf  affair’
began in France in 1989. The director of a secondary school in Creil
decided to exclude three girls wearing the headscarf because he
considered the scarf to undermine the secularity principle. The
Conseil  d’État  found  otherwise,  and  stated  that  the  pupils  could
make  their  own  decisions  on  the  matter.  Yet  in  1994,  the  issue
resurfaced  when  the  Minister  of  Education  declared  that  the
headscarf  was  a  ‘conspicuous  sign  in  itself’  and  reflected  a
proselytising attitude. However, the Conseil d’État maintained its
previous  position.  Only  at  the  beginning  of  2000,  the  debate
became heated and finally led to the prohibition of the headscarf in
public schools as well as to the later prohibition of the full-face veil
in all public places.55 In its ruling in S.A.S., the Court cited what is
referred to as the Stasi report,56 which  called  for  banning  the
Islamic  headscarves  in  schools  in  order  to  preserve  Republican
values. The Court’s approach effectively effaced the process of
politicising the headscarf, initiated by the French state, and made it
appear as if the headscarf was somehow an inherently political
symbol.
55  See Patrick Simon and Valérie Sala Pala, ‘”We are not all multiculturalists yet” France
swings between hard integration and soft anti-discrimination’ in Steven Vertovec and
Susanne Wessendorf (eds.) The Mutliculturalism Backlash. European discourses,
policies and practices (Routledge 2010).
56  The president appointed a commission of enquiry, headed by Bernard Stasi, for the
question of secularity in French schools. The report, published in 2003, recommended
a law that would prohibit the display of any ‘conspicuous religious signs’ in public
schools. See Talal Asad, ‘French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair”’ (2006) 8(1, 2)
The Hedgehog Review 95.
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The point I wish to reiterate by revisiting the debate over Islamic
clothing in relation to disobedience and subjectivity is that the lack
of essence in language inevitably makes ‘the course of the legal
argumentation somewhat unpredictable – and at the same time
perfectly consistent’.57 Language is unpredictable and porous in the
sense that  ‘the outcome of  the cases cannot be predicted based on
the explicit argumentation of the previous case law, and consistent
in the sense that the logic of the legal argumentation can be traced
back to the subjectivation of the citizen’.58 Because the Muslim
woman wearing the headscarf or the full-face veil is ‘the other’, her
self-identification both as  a  devout  Muslim and as  a  ‘Western’
citizen is rejected. The Muslim woman wearing the headscarf or the
full-face  veil  cannot  be  included  in  ‘us’,  because  that  would
dismantle the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘the other’, therefore
dismantling  not  only  ‘the  other’,  but  ‘us’  as  well.59 For  the  same
reason,  the  Turkish  law  is  reluctant  to  recognise  religious  and
ethnic minority identities.
The headscarf cases demonstrate that the law (re)produces
subjectivities both implicitly and explicitly. The most profound,
usually  implicit,  subject  of  law  is  the  autonomous  liberal  subject
detected  by  many  critical  legal  scholars.  The  headscarf  cases  offer
glimpses  of  the  implicit  characteristics  required  from  the  proper
citizen  –  the  one  on  top  of  the  hierarchies  of  citizenship,60 as  the
cases force the law to explicate them.
The dynamics of othering revealed by the headscarf cases have
taken different directions in France and in Turkey, despite them
both  being  advocates  of  the  secularity  principle  (laïcité, laiklik).
Mullally  argues that  in France,  the laïcité principle has become an
instrument of boundary maintenance not only in the public sphere,
57  Kati Nieminen, ‘Disobedient subjects - constructing the subject, the state and religion
in the European Court of Human Rights’ (2015) 21(4) Social Identities 312.
58  Kati  Nieminen,  ‘S.A.S.  v.  France:  Law,  Islamophobia  and  the  full-face  veil  ban’
(Unpublished manuscript 2017). This does not mean that the result is pre-determined,
because the Court could decide to conceptualize religion differently at any time, or to
reach a different conclusion despite the conceptualizations.
59  Kati  Nieminen,  ‘S.A.S.  v.  France:  Law,  Islamophobia  and  the  full-face  veil  ban’
(Unpublished manuscript 2017).
60  See Siobhán Mullally, ‘Gender equality, citizenship status, and the politics of
belonging’ in Martha Albertson Fineman (ed.) Transcending the boundaries of law.
Generations of feminism and legal theory (Routledge 2011) 201; Sherene Razack,
‘Imperilled Muslim Women, Dangerous Muslim Men and Civilised Europeans: Legal
and Social Responses to Forced Marriages’ (2004) 12 (2) Feminist Legal Studies 155.
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but  also  in  the  private  sphere.   For  example,  in  2008,  the  Conseil
d’État  denied  Mme  M  citizenship,  a  Moroccan  citizen  whose  four
children  were  all  French  nationals,  due  to  her  ‘insufficient
assimilation’  into  France.  According  to  the  court,  Mme  M  ‘had
adopted a radical religious practice, which was incompatible with
the essential values of French society’. The radical practices of Mme
M included  wearing  the niqab,  maintaining  links  to  her  culture  of
origin,  and  confining  her  daily  life  predominately  to  the  private
sphere of her home.61 In  France,  the  secularity  principle  has
apparently invaded the private sphere, whereas in Turkey, religious
symbols, such as the headscarf, are increasingly tolerated in public.
3.1.2 REBELS WITHOUT A CAUSE – CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE,
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION AND THE ART OF
ARGUMENTATION IN THE CASE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The  collection  of  the  case  material  in  the  second  article, Rebels
without a cause, was based on my analysis of the elements related
to civil disobedience and conscientious objection in theories on civil
disobedience. The theoretical discussion on civil disobedience is
diverse and has a long history, but certain overarching features can
be identified, such as the communicative function of disobedience,
and the disobedient’s overall fidelity to the legal order. By using the
Hudoc database, it was relatively easy to find cases of conscientious
objection to military service, as conscientious objection could be
used  as  a  search  term.  Finding  examples  of  civil  disobedience  in
case law, on the other hand, required a broader approach. I
searched  for  cases  that  concerned  political  protests  and
campaigning for social  change,  and one case led to another.  These
freedom of expression cases concern published material that is
critical of the army and the state’s treatment of its minority
61  Siobhán Mullally, ‘Gender equality, citizenship status, and the politics of belonging’ in
Martha Albertson Fineman (ed.) Transcending the boundaries of law. Generations of
feminism and legal theory (Routledge 2011) 194–195.
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populations.  The Court’s approach to them indicates that the law is
tolerant  of  opinions  that  are  unlikely  to  invoke  any  serious
challenge for the status quo – of ‘ineffectual troops of leafleteers’62 –
but wary of protests that are not confined in ‘mere criticism.63 The
cases are by no means intended to be a comprehensive collection of
ECtHR cases of civil disobedience or conscientious objection64, but
the cases cited here serve as illustrative examples of the different
forms that disobedience takes, and the collection presented here
constitutes an attempt to identify ‘real-life’ cases of the law’s
encounters with disobedience.
The main argument in Rebels without a cause is that the Court’s
chosen  path  of  argumentation  in  the  selected  cases  neutralise  the
potential  for  profound  social  and  political  change,  such  as  re-
thinking the militaristic  state.  This can be achieved within the law
either by labelling the disobedient act as a private matter lacking
significant  political  dimensions,  or  by  labelling  the  act  as  violent
and/or undemocratic. Conscientious objection to military service
has  been  treated  by  the  Court  as  a  matter  of  personal  conviction,
not  as  a  political  statement  falling  within  the  scope  of  freedom  of
expression.  This  line  of  legal  evaluation  is  not  as  self-evident  as  it
might seem. For example,  some of  the applicants have been active
in anti-militarist social movements and publicly defended their
pacifist  views.  Their  attempt to challenge the militaristic  ideal  of  a
citizen  has  been  silenced  by  the  Court.  Christodoulidis  and  Veitch
discuss  the  law’s  ‘logic  of  misreading,  where  what  is  at  stake  is
nothing less than the expressability of a statement as political’.65
They suggest both that the law silences the political claim itself and
that  this  silencing  is  unchallengeable,  making  the  law  a  source  of
double silencing.66 To  a  large  extent,  the  law’s  meaning  making  is
also  unchallengeable,  that  is,  how  the  Court  conceptualises  and
contextualises  the  material  it  considers  relevant.  Further,  my
analysis reveals that what is categorised as undemocratic or violent
62  Dissenting opinion in Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1977) 3 EHRR 218.
63 Saygili and Falakaoǧlu v. Turkey (No 2) para 28.
64  See, in addition, for example, Herrmann v. Germany App  no  9300/07  (ECtHR,  26
June 2012).
65  Emilios Christodoulidis and Scott Veitch ‘The ignominy of unredeemed politics:
Revolutionary speech as différend’ (1997) 10(2) International Journal for the
Semiotics of Law 149, 147–149. Emphasis original.
66  Ibid 143, 154.
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– and therefore outside of the scope of freedom of expression – is
not  unequivocal,  but  a  result  of  active  meaning  making.  As
Celikates observes, ‘describing an event, activity, person or group as
“violent”,  far  from  being  a  neutral  observation,  is  always  also  a
politically  charged  speech  act  that  can  reproduce  forms  of
marginalisation […]’.67 Thus,  the  legal  categorisations  are  not
confined  to  the  legal  sphere,  nor  are  they  detached  from  general
language usage.
The  method  adopted  both  in Disobedient subjects and Rebels
without a cause is close reading of the case material. The analysis is
not doctrinal in that it does not make normative claims concerning
the  correct  interpretation  of  the  positive  law.  Rather,  my  analysis
progressed  in  what  can  be  described  as  a  hermeneutical  circle.  I
approached  the  material  with  certain  questions  in  mind.   For
example,  how  does  the  Court  approach  acts  of  symbolic
disobedience?   Furthermore,  how  does  it  position  the  law  in
relation  to  the  individual’s  moral  claims  on  the  one  hand,  and  the
interests of the state on the other? These questions developed
during the initial reading of the cases as I began to understand how
they were related to the larger contexts of Turkish citizen
subjectivity  and  the  building  of  the  nation  state  as  well  as  how
meaning making steers the course of legal argumentation. This led
to  my  asking  different  questions,  including  how  does  the  Court
implicitly define religion, and how this definition affects the course
of  legal  argumentation (Disobedient subjects);  how does the Court
reproduce  the  dichotomy  of  personal/political,  and  how  does  this
dichotomising affect the potential of social protests (Rebels without
a cause)?
My interpretation of the cases is contextual. I interpret the
struggle between the applicant, who challenges the prevailing
interpretation  of  the  Turkish  citizen  subject,  and  the  response  by
the  Turkish  government,  in  the  historical,  social,  and  political
context of the nation-building process of modern Turkey.
Understanding the context is important not only for understanding
the logic of the parties’ arguments, but also for the Court’s
arguments. The Court allows contextual elements into its
67  Robin Celikates, ‘Democratizing civil disobedience’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social
Criticism 982, 984.
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argumentation  in  at  least  two  ways.  Firstly,  the  margin  of
appreciation doctrine grants the member states the right to
interpret the Convention obligation in relation to their respective
circumstances.  Secondly,  the  path  for  the  legal  argument  is  paved
by  the  meaning  the  Court  inserts  e.g.  into  the  headscarf  or
conscientious objection.
The philosophical debate over civil disobedience and
conscientious  objection  does  not  have  a  place  in  legal
argumentation, but how civil disobedience is regarded as public and
political and conscientious objection as private and personal in
many  theories,  is  reflected  in  how  the  law  deals  with  acts  of
disobedience. My argument in Rebels  without  a  cause is that the
political  challenge  the  objectors  pose  to  their  society  is  in  legal
proceedings transformed into a question of the personal right to
freedom of religion and belief. The reason the Court (dis)misses the
political dimension of conscientious objection may be related to its
inability or unwillingness to recognise the symbolic element of
conscientious objection. Conscientious objectors do not only invoke
their  personal  right to freedom of  thought,  but they may also wish
to contest the militaristic foundations of a nation state, the
glorification  of  killing  and  dying  in  the  name of  the  nation,  which
are ideals embedded in the ideal citizen subjectivity.
It is interesting that the Court’s argumentation strategy in the
Islamic headscarf cases is completely opposite to the argumentation
used  in  the  cases  of  conscientious  objection  to  military  service.  In
the headscarf cases, the Court chooses to emphasise the headscarf
as a political symbol, whereas it treats conscientious objection as a
manifestation of personal belief. It would be perfectly plausible to
reverse the two strategies,  and regard the headscarf  primarily  as a
manifestation  of  personal  belief,  and  conscientious  objection  as  a
political statement. While the reversal might not have a significant
impact on the outcome of the cases, it would compel the Court, and
therefore us all, to recognise that the Court’s interpretations are
neither neutral nor without implications both for the course of legal
argumentation, and for our ability to re-imagine our societies.
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3.1.3 WHO BELONGS? THE TURKISH CITIZEN SUBJECT IN
TURMOIL
The third article, Who belongs, discusses the attempts to expand
and question the prevailing notion of what it means to be a Turkish
citizen and its relationship to religion and ethnicity in particular.
The emphasis is on the different ways that the citizen subjectivity is
constructed both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the sphere of law. The article
itself  served  somewhat  as  a  turning  point  for  the  research  project.
Thus far, my analysis had focused on legal cases, and the analytical
framework  –  namely  the  dichotomies  of  public/private  and  the
conceptualisation of the headscarf as religious, cultural, or political
– was first ‘extracted’ from the cases, and then used to re-interpret
the  cases  in  their  social,  political  and  historical  contexts.  In Who
belongs, my approach turned objects  – the court,  the cabinet,  and
the  street  –  into  concepts,  which  allowed  me  to  observe  the  law
from new angles.
The article Who  Belongs discusses  the  role  of  the  law  in
constructing the Turkish citizen subject in three different sites: the
courtrooms, cabinets and the streets. The courtroom, the cabinet
and the street reflect the idea of separation of power into judiciary,
legislative and executive powers. Thus, my analysis can be
understood  as  an  inquiry  into  the  role  of  law  in  each  branch  of
power.  The  first  site  is  the  home  field  of  law;  the  second  is  the
political  scene  where  politics  transform  into  law;  and  the  third
scene  is  the  one  in  which  law  and  order  are  maintained.  The  law,
both  as  discursive  and  tangible  practices,  is  present  in  all  the
scenes. It is the law that operates in the courtroom, the law that can
be  used  as  bargaining  chip  in  the  cabinets,  and  the  law  that
legitimises the use of police force in the streets.
In Who belongs, my main question concerns how the law relates
to the transforming Turkish citizen subjectivity. In making sense of
the law’s role in the subject production process, I utilise Rancière’s
concepts of police and politics. For Rancière, politics is a battle over
what and who is visible, dissensus over what is political in the first
place. The police, on the other hand, is the apparent self-evidence of
the  established  social  order.  The  police  is  what  makes  and
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maintains the distinctions between visible and invisible, speakable
and unspeakable, possible and impossible. Following Rancière, I
argue  that  the  law  is  predominantly  situated  in  the  sphere  of  the
police,  because  the  law  is  a  central  mode  of  maintaining  the
prevailing notion of self-evidence.68
Interpreting the events in the courtroom, cabinets and streets
within  Rancièr’s  framework  of  police/politics  provides  an
understanding  of  the  dynamics  of  subjectivation  of  the  Turkish
citizen. For the cases pertaining to the dissolving of political parties,
the courtroom is  a  scene for constructing the citizen subject.  Until
recent years, under the rule of the AKP and president Erdoǧan, the
constitutional court of Turkey dissolved and banned many political
parties who identified themselves in terms of ethnicity or religion.
Modern Turkey was built  upon the idea of  a  unified nation,  which
left little room for ethnic minority identities and public
manifestations of religion. The pro-Kurdish parties that have been
dissolved by the constitutional court, were deemed to pose a threat
to state unity, and the Islamic parties, predecessors of the currently
ruling AKP, were identified with totalitarianism. For many years,
the  constitutional  court  guarded  the  ideal  of  a  unified,  secular
nation. This trend has now come to an end.
The cabinets – the scene of governmental politics – is where the
characteristics of the ideal citizen are debated. Who belongs
addresses the relationship between the ethnic and religious
majority  and  minorities  in  Turkey,  and  how  a  citizen  subject  is
delineated in relation to ‘the other’. For years, the so-called Kurdish
question has reflected the identity struggles of the Kurds, which has
contested  the  idea  of  a  unified  nation.  While  during  this  decades-
long struggle, there have been many phases of gradual progress and
improvement in minority rights, the crux of the matter seems
insolvable, as the recognition and institutionalisation of the Kurdish
identity would mean eroding the very foundation of the nation.
68  Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: politics and philosophy (Julie Rose tr, University of
Minnesota  Press  1999)  36;  Jacques  Rancière,  ‘Ten  Theses  on  Politics’  (2001)  5(3)
Theory & Event 1,  21;  Jacques  Rancière.  ‘Who  is  the  subject  of  the  rights  of  man?’
(2004) 103 (2–3) South Atlantic Quarterly 297, 304; Ari Hirvonen, ‘Tasa-arvon
demokratia – Jacques Rancière, erimielisyyden ajattelija’ in Kotkas, Toomas and
Lindroos-Hovinheimo, Susanna (eds.) Yhteiskuntateorioiden oikeus (Tutkijaliitto.
Episteme 2010) 327, 356.
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Finally, the streets are where the citizens themselves re-establish
and contest  citizen subjectivity.  The demonstrators at  Gezi  Park in
2013  could  not  be  treated  as  a  unified  group,  and  it  was  precisely
their diversity that threatened the unity of the Turkish people. The
massively  violent  response  by  the  authorities  to  the  Gezi  Park
protest demonstrates that the state regarded the threat posed to the
unified citizen subject  to be real  and imminent.  In Who belongs, I
argue  that  for  a  brief  moment,  a  Rancièrian  unpredictable  subject
walked the streets of Istanbul. This subject was unpredictable in the
sense  that  it  did  not  reproduce  the  ethnic,  religious,  or  political
dividing lines of the Turkish society.
The three sites were selected because they were topical. At the
time  of  writing  the  article,  the  role  of  the  Turkish  Constitutional
Court was changing. While it had been, with the army, an important
guardian  of  the  Kemalist  legacy  on  which  modern  Turkey  is
founded,  its  power  over  deciding  the  faith  of  political  parties  has
been stripped by the current government. Furthermore, at the time
of  writing  the  article,  it  became  apparent  that  the  Kurdish  peace
process  was  not  as  successful  as  it  initially  appeared.  Instead  of
recognising  ethnic  diversity,  it  turned  into  another  bloodshed.
Moreover,  the  outburst  of  protests  in  Gezi  Park  in  Istanbul  were
recent, and it is interesting that they appeared to communicate with
the global Occupy movement, rather than with the Turkish tradition
of protests. In their lack of unity, the protesters challenged the
Turkish citizen subjectivity, whilst the government’s violent
response to the protests illustrated that although some fundamental
changes  were  occurring  in  the  foundation  of  modern  Turkey,  in
some  important  ways,  the  state  continued  to  work  with  the  same
logic it always had. For example, despite recent changes in the role
of  religion  in  the  public  sphere  in  Turkey,  ethnic  and  religious
minorities remain excluded from Turkish subjectivity. The Turkish
citizen  subjectivity  continues  to  be  construed  primarily  along  the
same old dividing lines of the society. This, I believe, illustrates the
point  I  made  earlier  pertaining  to  the  discourses  of  othering  that
constituted  not  only  ‘the  other’  but  ‘us’  as  well.  Therefore  any
attempt to include the excluded can be regarded as a threat for the
notion of ‘us’.
The  observation  that  in  some  fundamental  ways,  the  logic  by
which the Turkish state operates has not changed despite the
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decline of the secularity principle. This was affirmed by the way the
government  handled  the  coup  attempt  in  the  summer  of  2016.  In
the  past,  the  military  coups  in  Turkey  have  been  initiated  by  the
Kemalists,  who  perceived  themselves  as  guardians  of  Atatürk’s
secular legacy.  This time,  however,  it  is  not clear who or what was
behind  the  coup  attempt.  President  Erdoǧan accused a US-based
preacher,  Fethullah  Gülen,  for  conspiring  with  the  coup;  some
accused President Erdoǧan himself for orchestrating the coup
attempt in order to strengthen his own position. In the aftermath of
the attempted coup, to fight a ‘terrorist network’ that was allegedly
infiltrating state structures, over 40 000 people were arrested and
at  least  80  000  were  removed  from  their  jobs,  including  military
officials, judges, prosecutors, academics, teachers and journalists.
Many  newspapers,  especially  those  reporting  from  the  Kurdish
southeast, were closed.69 The  so-called  Kurdish  question  had  also
escalated,  as  the  Turkish  government  ordered  a  military  attack  on
separatist Kurds in the southeast.70
The first three articles, Disobedient subjects, Rebels  without  a
cause and Who belongs, all  relate  to  the  construction  of  modern
Turkish  citizen  subjectivity  (‘us’).  The  Muslim woman wearing  the
Islamic headscarf,  the conscientious objector,  the Kurds struggling
to  be  recognised  as  an  ethnic  minority,  and  the  Gezi  Park
protestors,  all  pose  the  same  question  for  the  law.  They  challenge
the  prevailing  notion  of  possible  identities  and  aspire  to  shift  the
69  --‘Turkish deputy PM: Mass arrests ‘largely done’’ Al Jazeera (15 October 2016)
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2016/10/turkish-deputy-pm-mass-
arrests-largely-161014190924037.html accessed 9 January 2017.
 --’Turkey sacks 10,000 civil servants, shuts media outlets’ Al Jazeera (31 October
2016) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/10/turkey-sacks-10000-civil-servants-
shuts-media-outlets-161030135059539.html accessed 9 January 2017.
 --’Turkey issues warrant for US-based preacher Fethullah Gülen in failed coup’ The
Guardian (4 August 2016)
 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/04/turkey-warrant-fethullah-gulen-
failed-july-coup> accessed 9 January 2017.
 Constanze Letsch, ‘Turkey’s post-coup crackdown – in figures’ The Guardian (19
August 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2016/aug/19/turkeys-
post-coup -crackdown-in-figures> accessed 9 January 2017.
 Maeve  Shearlaw.  ‘Turkish  journalists  face  abuse  and  threats  online  as  trolls  step  up
attacks’ The Guardian (1 November 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2016/nov/01/turkish-journalists-face-abuse-threats-online-trolls-attacks> accessed 9
January 2017.
70  Kiran Nazish, ‘Cizre in ruins as Turkey lifts curfew on Kurdish towns’ Al Jazeera (13
March 2016) <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/cizre-ruins-turkey-lifts-
curfew -kurdish-towns-160312113030597.html> accessed 9 January 2017.
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limits of ‘us’ further in order to include the excluded, or to question
the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in more profound ways.
As  the  subjectivation  of  ‘us’  is  entangled  with,  and  in  fact
inseparable from, the subjectivation of ‘the other’, it was natural for
me to look into the ways the law contributes to othering practices.
This was perhaps another turning point for this  research project.  I
could have chosen to analyse how the law allows the subjectivities
to be contested and reinforces the disobedient’s  pursuit.  Instead,  I
chose to investigate what our production and treatment of ‘the
other’ tells about ‘us’.
3.2 THE OTHER
3.2.1 THE DETAINEE, THE PRISONER, AND THE REFUGEE.
THE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENT SUBJECT PRODUCTION
In the fourth article, The detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee,  I
analyse the dynamics of subject production at the Guantanamo Bay
detention center, the maximum-security (supermax) prisons in the
US, and the European refugee camps. My objective is to explore the
ways  in  which  reduced  legal  subjectivities  that  are  vulnerable  to
violence  and  exploitation  are  produced  and  resisted  in  these  sites.
The  analysis  is  based  on  secondary  sources  that  range  from
newspaper  articles  to  activist  sources,  from  the  reports  of  human
rights institutions, such as Amnesty International and Human
Rights  Watch,  to  UN  documents  and  reports,  government  reports
and  other  official  documents.  Writing  the  article  was  a  long  and
complicated  process.  It  was  a  challenge  to  grasp  the  dynamics
between the law and different forms of  resistance that  occurred in
the  three  sites.  In  fact,  the  sites  selected  for  analysis  were  initially
different. As mentioned previously, I became interested in hunger
striking  as  resistance  in  the  context  of  Turkey  and  the  Turkish
equivalent to the supermax, namely the F-type prison. However, the
focus  of  the  article  eventually  shifted  to  the  US  and  Europe.  In
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addition,  as  I  decided  to  concentrate  on  the  present,  despite  the
relevance  for  subjectivation  and  resistance,  the  long  history  of
hunger  strikes  by  the  suffragettes,  Irish  Republicans,  and  Gandhi,
to name only a few, were beyond the scope of the article.
The case that initially made me interested in hunger striking was
the ECtHR case of Saygili and Falakaoǧlu v. Turkey (2), as hunger
striking was identified as a violent method  of  protest.  My  line  of
questioning  was  that  if  hunger  striking  could  be  conceptualised  as
violent,  then  why  not  also  consider  the  practices  to  which  the
hunger strikers were subjected to be violent? What would become
visible if the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques, solitary
confinement of prisoners, and even institutional indifference for the
basic needs of the refugees were placed on the continuum of violent
practices  –  conceptualised  as  torture?  Here  torture  does  not
correspond  to  any  legal  definition.  Instead,  it  is  used  to  describe
violent subject production techniques that aim to destroy ‘the
victim’s  world  as  they  know it’,71 and to produce less-than-human
subjectivities in which the legitimation of violence inheres. Quoting
Cover, I explain that the martyr – the hunger striker – on the other
hand,  ‘insists  in  the  overwhelming  force  that  if  there  is  to  be
continuing life,  it  will  not  be in terms of  the tyrant’s  law’  and that
the hunger striker refuses to assume the less-than-human
subjectivity reserved for them.72
The  position  that  subjectivities  are  produced  not  only
discursively  but  also  in  violent  (physical)  practices,  reiterates  the
point of social constructionism that not only words but e.g. objects
and  gestures  can  be  used  for  communication  and  conveying
meaning.  Non-discursive  violence  is  therefore  a  powerful  way  to
communicate the victims’ unimportance and inferiority. I contend
71 Robert  M.  Cover,  ‘Violence  and  the  Word’  (1986)  95 Yale L J 1601, 1603. Another
example of the different ways in which social reality is created with words is my using
the word ‘torture’ to describe the techniques of violent subject production, instead of
using it as a legal category. The legal concept of torture is not only descriptive but also
prescriptive (as is  any other use of  the word).  The law claims ownership over words,
and hence phenomena, by imposing the legal definition of words beyond the legal
sphere.  To  provide  two  more  examples,  consider  the  words  ‘rape’  and  ‘racist’.  Both
words have their own respective legal meanings (which, of course, are indefinite and
subject to constant legal debate). However, both words can also be used irrespective of
their legal definitions to capture our lived experiences. It is important that the legal
understanding of words does not override this possibility.
72   Robert M. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ (1986) 95 Yale L J 1604–1605.
28
that the violent practices that the detainee, the prisoner, and the
refugees are subjected to, effectively communicate their inferiority
and  justify  their  discrimination  as  well  as  further  violence  against
them.
Along  with  hunger  striking,  the  use  of  law  as  a  means  of
resistance is  discussed in the article.  Some of  the torture practices
have  been  successfully  contested  in  courts.  For  example,  the
European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged the inability of
Greece to ensure adequate living conditions and appropriate
asylum procedure in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.73 In
Ashker v. Brown,74 the Center for Constitutional Rights successfully
challenged the use of prolonged solitary confinement in supermax
prisons,  and  the  Guantanamo  Bay  detainees  have  been  able  to
establish the jurisdiction of the US courts over the detention centre
and rights to due process in several cases.75 However,  the  main
premise throughout the article is that the violent subject production
techniques have not fundamentally changed despite some success
in the courtrooms. Indeed, many of the refugees in Europe continue
to live in poor conditions in tent camps and without effective access
to justice.  Many Guantanamo detainees also continue to be held in
indefinite detention despite being cleared for release. Furthermore,
solitary confinement is still frequently used in Californian prisons,
and  the  new  ‘behaviour  based’  step-down  policy  that  replaces  the
debriefing process is fundamentally the same as its predecessor.
I conclude that while legal channels may provide ways to contest
some  aspects  of  the  violent  practices,  they  are  not  well  suited  for
challenging the reduced subjectivities reserved for the detainee, the
prisoner and the refugee. It seems as if the othering practices of law
can be challenged by legal means, but not the othering logic behind
them. The Guantanamo Bay detainees, even when released, are not
able  to  rid  themselves  of  the  danger  associated  with  them,  and  by
73 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece ECHR 2011. Returning refugees back to Greece is,
however, again possible, see Harriet Agerholm, ‘EU says member states can begin
deporting refugees and migrants back to Greece from March’ Independent (8
December 2016) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/europe-
refugees-migrants-greece-march-a7462921.html> accessed 9 January 2017.
74 Ashker v. Governor of California No. 4:09-cv-05796-CW (N.D. California, 2012).
75  See e.g. Rasul v. Bush No. 03–334, June 28, 2004; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld No. 03-6696,
June 28, 2004; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld No. 05-184, June 29, 2006; Boumediene v. Bush
No. 06-1195, June 12, 2008.
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definition,  supermax  prisoners  pose  a  threat  to  the  general  prison
population, the prison staff, and to society. Likewise, the refugee is
increasingly regarded as posing a threat  to the West,  not only as a
potential terrorist, but also as a threat to the culture, values, and to
the ‘Western way of life’.
What possibilities does the detainee, the prisoner, or the refugee
have to challenge violent subjectivation? The resistance strategies
adopted  by  ‘the  other’  in  order  to  challenge  not  only  their
treatment,  but  their  subjectivation  as  a  dangerous  subject  with  a
reduced  legal  protection,  assumes  forms  that  do  not  ‘speak  law’,
such  as  hunger  striking.  My  position  is  that  the  hunger  striker  is
able  to  reveal  the  law’s  violence  in  a  way  that  is  not  possible  by
recoursing to legal remedies. Hunger strikes may not have been
highly effective in directly challenging violent practices, but their
symbolic  power  is  recognised  by  the  state,  judging  by  its  forceful
response  to  hunger  striking.  I  argue  that  the  hunger  strikers,  the
martyrs, are able to deconstruct the reduced subjectivity appointed
to  them  in  the  violent  practices,  and  they  force  the  law  to  face  its
own violence. Hunger striking calls out the law on its hypocrisy. The
law  simultaneously,  on  the  one  hand,  declares  the  universality  of
human rights and provides legal remedies, and on the other, allows
ongoing indefinite detention, favours the rights of the citizens,
discursively maneuvers the perception of solitary confinement not
as  a  punishment,  but  as  a  security  measure,  and  effectively  blocks
access to justice.
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3.2.2 FOREVER AGAIN: HOW DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES RE-
LEGITIMATE TORTURE IN THE US SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE’S ‘TORTURE REPORT’ AND THE CIA’S
RESPONSE
According to Foucault, ‘discourses are ‘practices that systematically
form  the  objects  of  which  they  speak’.76 The  fifth  and  final  article
addresses how less-than-human subjects are discursively produced.
The  subjectivities  created  in  language  have  very  tangible
implications  as  the  knowledge  we  produce  about  ‘the  other’
profoundly affects the way we think we can treat them because what
is  possible  to  do  to  another  person  is  affected  by  the  version  of
‘truth’ we create.77
Forever Again offers  an  analysis  of  two  official  documents  to
reveal their deflection of responsibility for torture. The first
document is  the executive summary of  the report  on the CIA’s  use
of  the  so  called  enhanced  interrogation  techniques,  based  on  an
investigation conducted by the US Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence  (SSCI,  the  Committee)  from 2009 to  2013.  The  actual
report,  apart  from  the  summary,  remains  classified.  The  second
document  is  the  CIA’s  response  to  that  report.  The  Committee’s
main findings were that these enhanced interrogation techniques
were ineffective in obtaining ‘actionable intelligence’, the CIA had
misled  the  other  officials,  and  that  the  Rendition,  Detention  and
Interrogation Program had been overall counterproductive to
national  interests.  The  CIA,  however,  insisted  that  despite  some
shortcomings, this programme had been successful in acquiring
important information for preventing terrorist attacks, and that the
information provided by the CIA to other officials had been overall
accurate.
In Forever again, I  demonstrate that  the problem identified by
the report is ultimately not the use of the so called enhanced
techniques, but the CIA’s disloyalty towards other state officials.
The CIA, in turn, insists that it simply followed both the law and the
76  Michel Foucault, The archaeology of knowledge (Social science paperbacks; World of
man, Tavistock, Routledge 1974) 49: see also Vivien Burr, Social constructionism (3rd
ed edn Routledge 2015) 64.
77  Ibid. See also Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and
Unmake Persons (Princeton University Press, 2013) 33.
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policies that were approved by the Department of Justice’s Office of
Legal Counsel. Both the report and response silence the question of
torture. As I argue in the article, torture is simultaneously
absolutely  prohibited  and  yet  lawfully  practiced.  In  principle,  the
issue  of  torture  is  a  simple  one:  the  question  of  whether  or  not
torture  is  legal  in  some  circumstances  is  completely  irrelevant  for
the law. In practice, utilitarian and pragmatic arguments justify
torture practices.
The analysed material in Forever again is  not  a  product  of  a
legal  process,  nor  does  it  have  direct  legal  implications.  The
question is why would it be important to discuss that material in the
context  of  the  law?  As  explained  earlier,  my  approach  to  the  law
does  not  fall  within  the  parameters  of  what  Douzinas  and  Gearey
refer to as restricted jurisprudence, which assumes that the sphere
of law can be mapped and marked according to certain markers and
includes  only  certain  institutions,  practices  and  actors.  Instead,
approaching  the  law  as  a  discourse,  I  look  into  the  ways  in  which
law  is  used  as  a  discursive  resource  in  the  texts.   Despite  their
peripheral  role  in  the  investigation,  it  was  evident  that  law  and
legality played a central part in the report. Further questions arose
from the following observation:  if  the aim of  the investigation was
not  to  discuss  the  legalities  of  these  so  called  enhanced
interrogation techniques, why was it emphasised throughout the
report  and  particularly  in  the  CIA’s  response  that  the  use  of  the
techniques  was  not  illegal?  If  the  prohibition  of  torture  is  without
exception,  why  was  such  extensive  explaining  required  on  issues
related to the enhanced techniques?
The  work  of  Scott  Veitch,  Stanley  Cohen,  and  Sten  Hansson
provided  me  with  an  orientation  that  enabled  me  to  begin  to
untangle  these  questions.  Veitch’s  notion  of  the  law’s
irresponsibility explains how the law and legal institutions are
central to organising irresponsibility along with responsibility. One
aspect  of  the way that  law seeps outside of  the ‘legal’  is  that  it  has
become the ultimate trump card in ethical debates. In other words,
the law equals good, or at least acceptable. Quoting Veitch, I argue
that the legal practices, categories and concepts do not confine
themselves  to  the  legal  sphere,  but  instead  also  guide  our
perception of harm and responsibility outside of it.  Our manner of
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thinking  and  talking  about  responsibility  is  influenced  by  the
legal.78
The  detailed  analysis  of  the  report  and  the  CIA’s  response  is
conducted within a framework that is based on the work by Cohen,
Hansson and other discourse theorists. These scholars address
different discursive strategies for blame-avoidance.79 The method of
analysis used in Forever again developed gradually. Firstly, I read
the Committee report and CIA’s response with a few questions in
mind.  I  was  interested  in  what  the  report  and  the  response  said
about  torture,  what  stance  they  adopted  in  relation  to  their  so-
called enhanced interrogation techniques, what the major findings
were  and  how  they  were  addressed  as  well  as  how  the  CIA
responded  to  the  critique.  Based  on  the  work  of  Cohen  and
Hansson,  I  began  to  code  the  material  to  determine  the  types  of
blame-avoidance strategies that were used in the material, and to
ascertain where the impression of irresponsibility originated from. I
used different colours to mark the different discursive tactics that I
discovered  in  the  texts.  Firstly,  I  marked  points  in  the  report  and
the response that concerned the following: responsibility and
agency, lawfulness and efficacy of the enhanced techniques,
explanations for the use of such techniques, descriptions of the
decision-making process, and points where the CIA expressed
agreement  or  disagreement  with  the  claims  of  the  report.  I
continued  by  marking  the  points  in  the  report  and  the  response
where different blame-avoidance techniques were used, such as
limiting responsibility spatially and temporally, justifying,
dissociating cause and consequence, evading and blurring the
question of responsibility, denying, silencing, relativising,
impersonalising, etc. In addition, I searched and marked the
documents for code words, such as ‘torture’ to determine the types
of contexts in which those words were used.
Coding  made  it  possible  to  recognise  recurring  patterns  of
responsibility avoidance, and to outline the two topoi that emerged
78  Scott Veitch, Law and irresponsibility: on the legitimation of human suffering
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 84–92.
79  Stanley Cohen, States of denial: knowing about atrocities and suffering (Polity 2001)
xvi, 344; Stanley Cohen, ‘Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims,
Denials, and Counterclaims’ (1996) 18(3) Hum  Rights  Q 517; Sten Hansson,
‘Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: A framework for analysis’
(2015) 26(3) Discourse & Society 297.
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from the texts: the topos of law and the topos of threat. By topos, I
refer to the basis for justification (the ultimate justification) and the
internal logic of argumentation. The topos of law bases justification
on  legality  and  the  authority  of  the  law,  (if  it  is  legal,  it  is
acceptable), while the topos of threat reflects everything ultimately
to  security  and  necessity.  In  the  topos  of  law,  the  basis  for
evaluation is authority, while in the topos of threat, it is security; in
the  topos  of  law,  the  basis  of  justification  is  legality,  while  in  the
topos  of  threat,  it  is  necessity;  and  in  the  topos  of  law,  the  main
discursive strategy is legitimation, while in the topos of threat, it is
rationalisation.80
Within this analytical framework, I was able to make visible the
strategies that were used in the report and in the response to alter
the  perception  of  the  self  (‘us’),  harm,  and  ‘the  other’. Forever
again relates to the theme of subjectivity in that it offers a glimpse
into  the  ways  in  which  the  violent  practices  discussed  in The
detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee are justified and excused
using the legal understanding of what constitutes responsibility.
The discursive responsibility avoidance for the use of the so-called
enhanced interrogation techniques, and their implicit justification
is explained by the curious entanglement of the topos of law and the
topos of threat. The discursive strategies for relativising torture are
identified as the merging of the topos of law and the topos of threat
– the equation of legality, efficacy and necessity.
Within  the  narrative  of  ‘us’,  ‘we’  are  often  sincere,  law  abiding
and  even  heroic.   One  version  of  that  narrative  is  unfolded  in
Forever again.  In  its  report  addressing  the  use  of  the  enhanced
interrogation techniques, the Senate Select Committee for
Intelligence  points  out  certain  serious  problems  with  the  CIA’s
conduct within the Rendition, Detention and Interrogation
Program.  However,  analysed  together  with  the  CIA’s  response  to
the report’s allegations, an othering narrative can be reconstructed
–  one  in  which  the  fundamentalist  Muslim  terrorist  threatens  the
80  Both  topoi  can  occur  within  the  law:  being  here  called  the  topos  of  law  does  not
indicate that this is the topos of law, other topoi being ‘foreign’ in law. Instead it simply
means that within this topos, the argumentation is based on legality, legitimacy, and
the authority of the law. The law as a whole, on the other hand, can and does draw e.g.
from the topos of threat, giving the arguments of security and necessity legal weight.
Cf. Samuli Hurri, Birth of the European individual: law, security, economy
(Routledge, 2014) 233.
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lives  of  innocent,  white  people  as  well  as  their  way  of  life.  In  this
story,  resorting  to  ‘unconventional  means’  in  ‘war  on  terrorism’  is
justified by necessity. Suddenly, it becomes possible to
simultaneously prohibit and legitimate the use of torture.
3.3 SUBJECTIVATION AND OTHERING IN LAW
The overall conclusions of this thesis are that the law both produces
the  subjectivities  of  ‘us’  and  its  ‘others’  in  discursive  and  other
social practices, and that the fragmentation of the human subject in
law legitimates violence against ‘the other’. These conclusions are
not completely novel or ground-breaking in themselves, and rather
than  in  them,  the  value  of  this  research  lies  in  making  visible  the
process that results in the totalization of the citizen subject,
fragmentation of the human subject and legitimation of violence. In
general, social constructionist approach is interested in process and
not a product, the aim being ‘[inquiring] into the methods of social
construction’.81 Therefore the findings presented in the articles
answer how-questions: How is the citizen subject produced? How is
disobedience  thwarted  in  legal  decision  making?  How  is  the  less-
than-human subject produced? How is torture legitimated?
The research methods are based on the theoretical framework of
social  constructionism and the idea of  law as a social  construction
in order to capture the workings of the law both inside and outside
the judicial practices. The research progressed, as described above,
in hermeneutic circles. The initial reading of the research material
resulted  in  an  observation  that  the  law  (re)produces  ‘us’  and  ‘the
other’.  The  analysis  then  proceeded  to  the how-questions and
observing the discursive and other practices (re)producing ‘us’ and
‘the  other’  in  law,  and  concluded  that  in  the  research  material
subjectivation and othering happen through politicization of the
Islamic headscarf, deflecting political protests, guarding the borders
81  Lester F. Ward (1905) as quoted in Joel Best, ‘Historical Development and Defining
Issues of Constructionist Inquiry’ in James A. Holstein & Jaber F. Gubrium (eds.)
Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008) 41.
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of ‘the people’, creating subjectivities with lessened protection, and
by merging the topoi of law and threat.
All  the  articles  discussed  above  address  the  issues  of  the  law,
subjectivation,  and  disobedience.  In  the  following  section,  I  draw
some general conclusions from these three themes, and pursue the
discussion further by reconstructing three narratives. The first sub-
section  deliberates  on  the  law  as  a  story  we  tell  ourselves  about
ourselves. The second sub-section addresses the fragmentation of
the  human  subject  in  law  and  the  implication  this  has  in
legitimating violence against vulnerable groups. Subjectivity is also
examined from the perspective of disobedience. The final sub-
section  continues  with  the  theories  of  civil  disobedience  and
inquires as to what role the theories have in producing the narrative
of ‘us’ as democratic, liberal, and rational. The articles follow these
final  remarks.  The  articles  are,  of  course,  independent  and  can  be
read separately. However, my intention is that this introduction and
especially the following section provides the reader with additional
perspectives on the explicit arguments presented in the articles, and
enables them to be read as a continuous story.
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4. THE STORIES WE TELL OURSELVES
4.1. NARRATIVE APPROACH
From politics to advertising, the story makes believe and by
that  it  makes  do,  it  takes  up  this  and  neglects  that,  it
classifies. On the other hand it produces oblivion, it
institutes silence on the things it does not talk about. And
because  it  is  always  ‘full’  and  closed,  it  makes  even  forget
that it is withholding something.82
Over the past few decades, narrativity has been used in social
research to understand the relationships between individuals and
groups,  and  the  dynamics  of  the  social,  political  and  historical
dimensions  of  the  social  world.  ‘Narrative’  refers  here  to  both  a
method of inquiry and a story under research.83 The term narrative
is  used  in  the  following  three  sections  in  the  latter  sense,  as  I
discuss and further develop the themes arising from the five articles
the law, the subject, and disobedience. A narrative as a story can be
understood as a representation of the ‘transformation of state of
affairs’  that  ‘do  not  simply  recount  happenings:  they  give  them
shape,  give  them  a  point,  argue  their  import,  proclaim  their
result’.84 In other words, a narrative is a ‘plot summary’, a re-telling
of  something  that  happened  and,  at  the  same  time,  constructing
that something.85 This  definition  allows  narratives  to  be  written,
oral, sign language, pictures, gestures, or any combination of these,
82  Michel de Certeau 1978 as cited in Wolfgang Kraus, ‘The Narrative negotiation of
identity and belonging’ (2006) 16(1) Narrative Inquiry 106.
83  Ivor  F.  Goodson  and  Scherto  R.  Gill,  ‘The  Narrative  Turn  in  Social  Research’  (2011)
Counterpoints 386, 18, 20–22; Barbara Johnstone, ‘Discourse analysis and narrative’
in Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton (eds.) The handbook of
discourse analysis (Blackwell 2001) 639.
84  See Gerald Prince, ’On Postcolonial Narratology’ in James Phelan and Peter J.
Rabinowitz (eds.) A Companion to Narrative Theory (Blackwell 2005) 373.
85  Peter Brooks, ‘Narrative in and of the Law’ in James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz
(eds.) A Companion to Narrative Theory (Blackwell 2005) 415, 419.
38
and it does not presume their falsehood, factuality or fictionality.86
Contemporary approaches to narratives do not take the narrative
(as  a  story)  at  face  value,  but  ‘generally  insist  on  the  idea  that  a
narrative constructs a version of events rather than [describe] them
in their true state’87 so that a narrative, is therefore performative. In
addition, the contemporary approaches view binary oppositions as
‘an unstable basis for meaning and as a place where the values and
hidden ideologies of a text are inscribed’.88 Nevertheless,
storytelling remains an important means of constructing social
bonds and collective identities.89 It is therefore important to remain
both  aware  and  critical  of  the  stories  we  tell  ourselves  about
ourselves, and the binaries we construct with our words.
The deconstructivist movement in narratology challenges the
idea  of  a  narrative  as  a  stable  and  coherent  structure,  and  thus
emphasises the constructedness of narratives as objects of research.
At this point, it is appropriate to reiterate that the story I tell is my
own construction about the stories we tell ourselves.90 It  is  not my
intention to replace any other narrative with an improved version of
the  course  of  events,  as  my  aim  is  simply  to  offer  an  alternative
insight into the various ways ‘we’ are constructed. The object of this
research  is  not,  after  all,  ‘the  other’.  Thus,  I  do  not  attempt  to
replace the othering perceptions with something else, something
that would capture the ‘real’,  or  to include the excluded.  Instead,  I
examine the way ‘we’ represent and reproduce the dichotomy
us/the other. Even when discussing ‘the other’, this is a book about
‘us’.  Of  course,  unraveling  one  part  of  the  dichotomy unravels  the
dichotomy  itself,  allowing  us  to  see  that  ‘the  other’  is  simply  the
difference marking ‘our’ identity.91
86  Gerald Prince, ’On Postcolonial Narratology’ in James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz
(eds), A Companion to Narrative Theory (Blackwell 2005) 373.
87  Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (Macmillan Press: St. Martin's Press
1998) 118.
88  Ibid 5; see also Wolfgang Kraus, ‘The Narrative negotiation of identity and belonging’
(2006) 16(1) Narrative Inquiry 105.
89  Wolfgang Kraus, ‘The Narrative negotiation of identity and belonging’ (2006) 16(1)
Narrative Inquiry 109.
90  See e.g. ibid 105; Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (Macmillan  Press:  St.
Martin's Press 1998) 48.
91  See e.g. Mark Currie, Postmodern Narrative Theory (Macmillan Press: St. Martin's
Press 1998) 17; Wolfgang Kraus, ‘The Narrative negotiation of identity and belonging’
(2006) 16(1) Narrative Inquiry 104–105; Chris Weedon, Identity and Culture:
Narratives of Difference and Belonging (Open University Press 2004) 3–4, 19.
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Section 4.2 focuses on the stories we tell  ourselves through the
law and about law. My main objective is to problematise the law as
a source of  responsibility  and justice and reveal  the ways in which
the law is incapable of rectifying its’ own violence. In other words, I
address the difficulties that the legal notion of responsibility poses
for recognising the myriad ways that responsibility is effaced in the
law  and  through  it.  As  I  will  demonstrate,  part  of  the  law’s
irresponsibility results from how the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the law
are created.
The  critical  approaches  to  subjectivity  have  revealed  that  the
legal subject is not the colourless and genderless subject it claims to
be, and furthermore, that the narrative of ‘our’ law as objective and
neutral  is  fictitious.  Feminist  scholars  have  asserted  that  the  legal
subject is, implicitly, male, white, able-bodied, autonomous,
rational, educated and self-interested.92  In addition to the implicit
assumptions regarding the legal subject, the law defines its subject
in explicit ways, as discussed in Disobedient subjects and The
detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee. In section 4.3, my aim is to
contribute  to  the  problematisation  of  the  legal  subject.  I  provide
evidence  that  the  apparently  unified  subject  of  law  is  actually
fragmented,  and  observe  the  ways  in  which  this  fragmentation
takes place. In the context of my analysis, this fragmentation
legitimises violence and discrimination by creating less-than-
human subjectivities in which the legitimation of violence inheres.
In other contexts, however, some type of in-betweenness may
provide  opportunities  to  challenge  the  law’s  dichotomies.  One
example of this is the struggle for recognition for transgender
identities and the problematisation of the gender dichotomy. Thus,
the process of fragmentation can also work in favour of recognition
in  law.  Nonetheless,  this  can  only  be  achieved  if  the  process  of
fragmentation is transparent. The problem of fragmentation in the
examples  mentioned  in  this  thesis  is  that  it  is  invisible,  and  this
makes it  impossible to challenge by using the language of  the law.
An even  more  fundamental  problem is  that  what  is  fragmented  in
my  examples  is  the  human  subject  itself.  Hannah  Arendt  has
famously stated that the right to have rights is, in our present time,
92  Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence. (Allen &
Unwin, 1990) 52, 53.
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ultimately a ‘right of every individual to belonging to humanity’ and
‘should be guaranteed by humanity itself’. Arendt also states that ‘it
is  by no means certain whether this  is  possible’.93 Indeed, it seems
as  if  it  is  a  constant  struggle  to  include  everyone  in  the  notion  of
humanity.
Section 4.4 presents my argument that the theories of civil
disobedience,  whose aim is  usually  to map the limits  of  acceptable
disobedience  in  a  democratic  society,  may  result  in  appropriating
the struggle of  ‘the other’  into ‘our’  narrative of  ‘us’  as  democratic,
progressive, and liberal. This does not imply that the subaltern does
not, or could not, belong to the notion of ‘us’. Instead, it means that
their struggle for recognition and belonging is silenced and narrated
as  a  phase  in  ‘our’  history.  Often  it  also  means  that  the  historical
violence and discrimination against the subaltern and the ways they
bleed  into  the  present  is  made  invisible.  My  argument  is  that  the
theories  of  civil  disobedience  can  be  understood  as  reproducing  a
historical  narrative  in  which  the  past  is  told  as  a  coherent,
progressive  story  and  in  which  the  persisting  dichotomy of  us/the
other is rendered invisible in order to preserve unified national
identity as well  as  the illusion of  an inclusive democracy.  The first
step is to analyse the theories of civil disobedience as narratives.
In  the  following  three  sections,  my  aim  is  to  demonstrate  how
the common themes of the five articles are connected. Admittedly,
reconstructing  the  common  themes  means  that  much  of  the
contents  of  the  articles  is  omitted.  The  discussion  on  the  law,
subject, and disobedience does not directly reiterate the arguments
made  in  the  articles,  but  rather  develop  them  further  in  an
independent manner and sketch directions for future research.




‘I cannot accept you giving reasons which have no relevance
to the case.’94
The  difficulty  in  challenging  the  othering  discourses  is  that  for  us,
the stories we tell ourselves about ourselves seem unequivocal,
natural, and true. Critical race theorists illustrate this difficulty by
telling two different stories about slavery in the US.95 According to
the dominant storyline, slavery was something terrible that
happened in the past.  Slavery ended with the American Civil  War,
but discrimination against the blacks persisted. As people became
increasingly aware and sensitive to the plight of the blacks, federal
statutes and case law gradually eliminated discriminatory practices.
The gap between blacks and whites continues to exist today, but it is
steadily closing.  A few decades ago, it would have been impossible
for  a  black  man  to  become  the  president  of  the  US,  but  even  this
changed in 2008. Admittedly, as the story goes, racism has not been
erased completely, but it predominately exists at the individual level
and  can  be  resolved  with  better  legislation  and  sanctioning  racist
practices.96
It is interesting to note that the narrative approach was
introduced  to  legal  scholarship  through  the  alternative  or
oppositional narratives that call attention to the stories of those
marginalised and excluded by legal thinking and procedure.97 As
Bell  remarks,  a  very  different  and  equally  true  story  can  be  told
from  the  same  facts  –  one  ‘filled  with  more  murder,  mutilation,
rape,  and  brutality  than  most  of  us  can  imagine  or  easily
94  Judge of the Bader-Meinhof trial, 5/8/75 as cited in Emiolios Christodoulidis and Scott
Veitch, ‘The Ignominy of Unredeemed Politics: Revolutionary Speech as Différend’
(1997) 10(29) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 142.
95  Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical race theory: an introduction (Critical
America, 2nd ed edn New York University Press 2012) 40–43.
96  Ibid 40, 41
97  Peter Brooks, ‘Narrative in and of the Law’ in James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz
(eds.) A Companion to Narrative Theory (Blackwell 2005) 415
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comprehend’.98 This  story  does  not  have  a  happy  ending,  but  an
ending that acknowledges the far-reaching consequences of slavery
and racism to the present day, visible in factors such as the higher
infant death rates among minorities,  school  dropout rates,  income
gaps, life expectancy, assets and educational attainment.99
Moreover, the progress we do observe is not necessarily a result of
increasing sympathy and evolving standards of decency and
conscience,  but  instead  stems  from  factors  such  as  the  need  to
improve the state’s reputation and maintain its international power
position.100
The  story  about  the  law  that  I  choose  to  tell  in  this  thesis  is
perhaps rather pessimistic. The same research material could be
interpreted very differently and other aspects, such as the
emancipatory side of law could be highlighted. However, my aim is
different. I wanted to challenge myself to examine closely the traces
of  law  in  the  society  and  to  hold  the  law  responsible  for  what  it
does.  This  approach  derives  from  scholars  such  as  Scott  Veitch,
Robert M. Cover, Colin Dayan and Costas Douzinas, who all address
the violence, the irresponsibility, and the false neutrality of the law.
My aim in this  thesis  is  not to replace one story with another,  one
definition  of  law  with  another  or  a  problematic  idea  of  the  legal
subject  with  a  better,  more  inclusive  one.  Instead,  I  attempt  to
determine  what  becomes  visible  if  the  law  is  constructed  as
something that does instead of something that is. This approach
does  not  coincide  perfectly  with  the  ‘law  in  books  /  law  in  action’
approach,  as  my  understanding  of  the  law  exceeds  what  the  legal
realists  would  usually  consider  to  be  law.101 I  am  interested  in  all
the  ways  the  law  works  in  judicial,  legislative,  and  administrative
98  Derrick Bell, And we are not  saved: the elusive quest  for racial  justice (Basic Books
1989) 217.
99  Ibid; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical race theory: an introduction
(Critical America, 2nd ed edn New York University Press 2012) 41, 46–47; Henry
Kamerling, ‘Assimilation, Exclusion, and the End of Punishment’ in Austin Sarat (ed.)
Crime and Punishment: Perspectives from the Humanities (JAI Press Inc 2005) 191.
100  Derrick Bell, ‘Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma’
(1980) 93 Harvard Law Review 518; Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical
race theory: an introduction (Critical America, 2nd ed edn New York University Press
2012) 41. See also George Lipsitz, ‘Civil Rights and White Identity Politics’ in Austin
Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (eds.) Cultural Pluralism, Identity Politics, and the Law
(University of Michigan Press 1999) 111–138; Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race
and Rights. Diary of a law professor (Harvard University Press 1991).
101  See Robert M. Cover. ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 (4) Harv L Rev. 4, 7.
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practices, as well as a discourse that is not limited to the legal home
field.
Why do  I  approach  the  law with  such  a  broad  brush  and  insist
that it is, in fact, the law that acts outside the institutional legal
settings?  My  argument  is  that  if  the  law  is  understood  as  a
discourse  rather  than  a  doctrine,  an  institution,  a  system,  or
something similar, then the otherwise invisible can be seen. My aim
has  been  to  uncover  how  the  ways  of  legal  thinking  –  inside  and
outside the ‘legal’ – shape our subjectivities, and in some cases,
allow and even justify violent practices. Maintaining the dichotomy
of the inside/outside of the law is useful for doctrinal research and
necessary for the judicial practices. However, this dichotomy should
not be taken for granted as something that is ‘real’. The reverse side
of  this  necessary  fiction  is  that  he  law  is  then  absolved  from  the
responsibility  of  its  consequences  that,  to  me,  it  should  not  be
allowed to disown.
The inside/outside divide is not only being constructed between
the  law  and  non-law,  but  also  within  ‘inside’  the  law.102 Criminal
law,  for  instance,  is  often  acknowledged  as  the  most  invasive  and
violent branch of law – and it is therefore considered important to
define and restrict the scope of criminal law. Although it is perfectly
plausible  to  ask  whether  the  criminal  law  is  the  most  invasive
branch  of  law,  given  the  intrusive  nature  of  cases  such  as  custody
issues  and  deportations,  the  idea  itself  has  resulted  in  some
artificial  practices  that  blur  what  actually  occurs  within  the  legal.
Borrowing  Dayan’s  example,  solitary  confinement,  while  the
practice itself and its detrimental effects on the human psyche
remain unaltered, is regarded differently by the US courts
depending  on  whether  it  is  deemed  a  punishment  or  an
administrative measure.103 It  is  as  if  ‘punishment’  would somehow
be essentially different from an administrative measure, despite the
practice and its effects being identical, merely because the intent
behind the practices is allegedly different.104
102  See Colin Dayan, The  Law  Is  a  White  Dog:  How  Legal  Rituals  Make  and  Unmake
Persons (Princeton University Press 2013) 75.
103  Ibid 81.
104  Ibid; see also Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical jurisprudence: the political
philosophy of justice (Hart Publishing 2005) 11–12. Generally speaking, intent plays a
crucial role in assigning legal responsibility, as explained by both Dayan and Veitch.
Emphasising the intent of the one who inflicts the pain effaces the suffering that is
44
In my articles, I discuss both how the law works within the ‘legal’
and  how  it  extends  its  consequences  beyond  it.  I  would  like  to
present two more examples of how the law works outside the legal
sphere: the law’s irreversible effects that cannot be undone in the
judicial review, and the potential chilling effect of criminalisation.
An extreme example of the irreparable effects of law is the ruined
lives  of  the  Guantanamo  Bay  detainees.  As  discussed  in The
detainee, the prisoner, and the refugee, many detainees continue to
be held at Guantanamo, despite having been cleared for release.
Those who have been released have no access to their former life as
they knew it. Some former detainees are not even allowed to return
to  their  home countries.  For  instance,  Tunisian  Lutfi  Bin  Ali,  who
spent 13 years at Guantanamo, is currently living in Kazakhstan in a
remote northern town. Bin Ali was initially supposed to integrate
into the Kazakh society within a two-year rehabilitation programme
for former Guantanamo detainees, financed by the International
Committee of the Red Cross. Bin Ali’s reality, however, proved to be
very  different,  and  he  is  still  prohibited  from  leaving  his  new
hometown.  Practically,  he  is  as  isolated  now  as  he  ever  was  in
detention.105 The detainees’ encounters with the law are not limited
to their struggles with questions of jurisdiction, due process,
humane living conditions and protection from torture, but continue
even  after  their  release.  The  capacity  of  the  law  to  rectify  its  own
repercussions is usually limited to either monetary or symbolic
compensations. In the case of former Guantanamo detainees,
neither is guaranteed.
The  chilling  effect  of  legal  proceedings  and  criminal
investigations is a well-known phenomenon. A topical example that
resonates with the themes of this thesis is Australia’s offshore
caused.  Thus,  cruelty  is  not  measured by the ‘pain and suffering inflicted,  but  by the
intent of the person who inflicts them’. Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How
Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons (Princeton University Press 2013) 186, 187,
198. The flip side of requiring the establishment of intention, which is the ‘pride of
modern criminal law’, is that ‘particularly in the case of large-scale commissions of
harms, its effect is not to make secure responsibilities but rather the opposite: to
engender impunity’. Scott Veitch, Law and irresponsibility: on the legitimation of
human suffering (Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 90, 108, 109.
105  Shaun  Walker,  '‘‘Here  I  have  nobody":  life  in  a  strange  country  may  be  worse  than
Guantánamo’ The Guardian 30 September 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2016/sep/30/worse-than-guantanamo-ex-prisoner-struggles-with-new-life-in-
kazakhstan> accessed 9 January 2016.
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detention  system  and  laws  restraining  publicity  regarding  the
detention centres. Resembling Guantanamo Bay’s history as a US
detention  centre  for  refugees  from Haiti  in  the  1990s,  Australia  is
using Manus Island and Nauru as an offshore detention centre for
refugees predominately from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and
Iraq.  Australia’s  policy  of  ‘offshore  processing’  was  introduced  in
2012. Refugees arriving by boat are sent to either Manus Island or
Nauru  for  indefinite  detention.  Australia  has  no  intention  of
relocating any of them in its territory, nor are there any other viable
resettlement options available.106 Amnesty International has
described the ‘offshore processing regime’ as explicitly designed to
inflict  damage  on  refugees  as  an  act  of  deterrence,  and  concluded
that the systematic and deliberate neglect and cruelty towards
refugees amounts to torture. 107
106  Ben Doherty, ‘Refugee camp company in Australia "liable for crimes against
humanity’’' The Guardian (25 July 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2016/jul/25/ferrovial-staff-risk-prosecution-for-managing-australian-
detention-camps>  accessed  9  January  2016;  see  also  Gareth  Hutchens,  ‘Asylum
seekers face life time ban from entering Australia if they arrive by boat’ The Guardian
(30 October 2016)
 <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/oct/30/asylum-seekers-face-
lifetime-ban-on-entering-australia-if-they-arrive-by-boat <accessed 12 January 2017.
107 ‘Island  of  Despair.  Austalia’s  ”Processing”  of  Refugees  on  Nauru’ Amnesty
International 2016, available at <https://uploads.guim.co.uk/2016/10/17/amnesty_
international_island_of_despair_final.pdf> accessed 12 January 2017.
 The detention centre at Manus Island has been found illegal and unconstitutional by
the PNG Supreme Court in April 2016. After the decision, some minor changes have
been made, but the detention regime or detention conditions has largely remained
unchanged. Ben Doherty, ‘Australia confirms Manus Island immigration detention
centre will close’ The Guardian (17 August 2016) <https://www.theguardian.
com/australia-news/2016/aug/17/manus-island-detention-centre-to-close-australia-
and-papua-new-guinea-agree> accessed 9 January 2017.
 Australia does not intend to resettle the refugees in Australia. The plan has been to
return the refugees to their countries of origin, resettle some of them in PNG, or
recently to the US. Ben Doherty, Helen Davidson and Paul Karp, ‘Papua New Guinea
court rules detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island illegal’ The Guardian (25
April 2016) >https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/26/papua-new-
guinea-court-rules-detention-asylum-seekers-manus-unconstitutional> accessed 9
January 2017; Elaine Pearson, ‘Will Australia Really Close the Manus Island Detention
Center?’ Human Rights Watch (18 August 2016) <https://www.hrw.org/
news/2016/08/18/will-australia-really-close-manus-island-detention-center>
accessed  9  January  2017;  Paul  Farrell,  ‘Refugees  on  Nauru  and  Manus  Island  to  be
resettled  in  US  –  as  it  happened’ The Guardian (13  November  2016)
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/live/2016/nov/13/australia-nauru-
manus-island-refugee-detaineeannouncement-live>  accessed 9 January 2017; Kerry
Fressard, 'We Are Witnessing The Unravelling Of The Cruel Offshore Detention
System' The Huffington Post (28 November 2016)
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/kerry-fressard/we-are-witnessing-the-
unravelling-of-the-cruel-offshore-detentio/> accessed 9 January 2017.
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The role of the law in constituting and maintaining the system is
twofold. Firstly, similarly to Guantanamo Bay detention centre for
suspected terrorists, the offshore detention centres for refugees in
Nauru  and  Manus  Island  are  legal  constructions  and  not  ‘outside
the  law’.  Secondly,  the  law  is  used  to  target  whistleblowers  and
journalists who are trying to publicise the conditions in the refugee
camps  and  pursue  a  change  in  Australia’s  refugee  policy.  For
example,  section  42  of  the  Border  Force  Act  criminalises
‘unauthorised disclosure’ about the conditions in the offshore
refugee camps by anyone working within the immigration detention
system. The government has argued that the secrecy clause, which
has been contested in the high court, would not result in situations
such as doctors being charged for speaking about the conditions at
the  camps  in  public.  Nevertheless,  just  by  being  in  force,  the  law
might  prevent  whistleblowing  and  other  attempts  to  publicise  and
publically criticise the detention system.108 According to the United
Nations special rapporteur, Australia has created ‘an atmosphere of
fear, censorship and retaliation’.109 Similar  examples  of  law’s
chilling  effects  can  be  observed  currently  in  the  US,  in  Native
108  Ben Doherty, ‘Immigration detention doctors challenge Border Force Act’s secrecy
clause in court’ The Guardian (26 July 2016) <https://www.
theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/jul/27/immigration-detention-doctors-
challenge-border-force-acts-secrecy-clause-in-court> accessed 9 January 2017; see
also Michael Koziol, '‘‘Fear, censorship and retaliation": United Nations rapporteur
slams Australia’s human rights record’ The Sydney Morning Herald (18 October 2016)
<http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/fear-cencorship-and-
retaliation-united-nations-rapporteur-slams-australias-human-rights-record-
20161018-gs4tt3.html> accessed 9 January 2017; see also ‘UN experts urge Tasmania
to drop its anti-protest bill’ United Nations Human Rights Office of the High
Commissioner, 2014 <http://un.org.au/files/2014/09/2014-09-10-tasmania-anti-
protest-bill.pdf> accessed 12 January 2017.
 Originally, the Tasmanian Protection from Protesters bill proposed fining
demonstrators who ‘prevent, hinder, or obstruct the carrying out of a business activity,
and  included  mandatory  jail  terms  up  to  two  years  for  repeat  offenders.  After  heavy
criticism from activists and UN rapporteur, the government decided to amend the bill
to not apply to demonstrations on public roads and footpaths, provided that they do
not block access to a business, and to cover only ‘industries that have been identified as
vulnerable to protest action’, such as mining and forestry. Michael Safi, ‘Tasmania to




109   Michael Safi, ‘Tasmania to focus anti-protest laws on anti-forestry and mining activists’
The Guardian (28 October 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014
/oct/28/tasmania-to-narrow-anti-protest-laws-to-target-anti-forestry-and-mining-
activists> accessed 9 January 2017.
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American-led anti-pipeline protests at Standing Rock, where,
according to the Sioux tribe, the oil pipeline would endanger water
supply and cultural heritage. The award-winning journalist Amy
Goodman  was  charged  by  a  North  Dakota  state  prosecutor  for
rioting, because of her documenting the protests.110 The charges
against  Goodman  were  dropped,  but  at  least  two  documentary
filmmakers  continue  to  face  felony  charges  for  recording  the
pipeline protests.111
The definitions of law the legal ‘insiders’ are most familiar with
(the  law  as  a  closed  system  of  positive  rules,  the  law  as  an
institutionalized  normative  order,  or  as  a  social  system,  for
example)  are  not  the  only  possible  narratives  of  law.  The  law  can
also  be  constructed  as  something  malleable  and  mercurial.  The
appropriate approach to law naturally depends on research
interests.  My  approach  has  been  to  stretch  the  concept  of  law  in
order  to  delve  deeper  into  the  questions  of  subjectivity  and
othering. It was almost as a side effect that I ended up challenging
the stories we tell ourselves about ‘us’ and our law. This, in turn, left
me with the question of responsibility – perhaps another paradox of
the  law.  The  story  of  law  that  we  cherish  is  one  which  distributes
responsibility. However, by distributing responsibility, the law also
sets limits to it.112 The  question  is  whether  the  legal  notion  of
responsibility limits our sense of overall responsibility to the extent
that  we  are  unable  to  acknowledge  our  role  in  contributing  and
upholding  global  inequality,  and  the  ways  we  benefit  from  it. We
are, to some extent, able to recognise that the refugees in Europe
have  a  right  to  protection.  But  while  we  are  preoccupied  with
filtering the ‘genuine’ refugees from ‘the economic migrants’ and
110  The new charge comes after the prosecutor dropped criminal trespassing charge. --
’Breaking: ND Prosecutor Seeks ”Riot” Charges Against Amy Goodman For Reporting
On Pipeline Protest’ Democracy Now (15 October 2016) <https://www.
democracynow.org/2016/10/15/breaking_nd_prosecutor_seeks_riot_charges>
accessed 9 January 2017.
111  Sam Levin, ‘Documentary film-makers face decades in prison for taping oil pipeline
protests’ The Guardian (20 October 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/oct/20/north-dakota-oil-pipeline-protest-film-makers-face-prison>
accessed  9  January  2017;  see  also  Sam  Levin,  ‘Dakota  Access  pipeline  protests:  UN
group investigates human rights abuses’ The Guardian (31 October 2016)
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/31/dakota-access-pipeline-
protest-investigation-human-rights-abuses> accessed 9 January 2017.
112  Scott Veitch, Law and irresponsibility: on the legitimation of human suffering
(Routledge-Cavendish 2007).
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‘bogus asylum seekers’, we seem to be unable to acknowledge our
responsibility in creating global inequality. The Western world is
heavily  dependent  on  the  cheap  production  of  goods  that  are
outsourced  to  the  East  and  South.  As  Delgado  et  al.  point  out,
formerly colonised people of colour are generally afflicted by poor
work conditions, sometimes amounting to serious health hazards as
well as inadequate salaries. After robbing the colonised ‘third world’
of  its  riches,  sowing  political  discord  and  suppressing  the
development of local leaders, the ‘first world’ continues to exploit
the former colonies.113 The  same  applies  to  the  effects  of  climate
change:  while  the  Western  standard  of  living  and  consumerism
have contributed to the climate change disproportionately, most of
its damaging effects, such as flooding and desertification, affect the
former colonised populations.
In order to approach the problem of responsibility, we might do
well  by  asking  what  the  stories  are  that  we  tell  ourselves  and  how
they  affect  the  way  we  perceive  reality  and  our  role  in  relation  to
others.  In  the  following  two  sections,  I  touch  upon  this  task  by
asking,  how  is  the  seemingly  unified  human  subject  in  law
fragmented? What are the implications of this fragmentation? In
what ways does our perception of the law’s neutrality contribute to
othering? And finally, do the theories of civil disobedience
contribute  in  the  deceptive  narrative  of  continuous  and  inevitable
progression towards greater liberty and improved democracy?
113  Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical race theory: an introduction (Critical
America, 2nd ed edn New York University Press 2012) 111–112.
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4.3 THE SUBJECT
He  does  not  see  her,  because  for  him  there  is  nothing  to
see.114
With its classifications, language makes the world seem controllable
and less arbitrary. It creates structures and order, which are then
perceived as real and natural.115 In his seminal work, Orientalism,
Edward  W.  Said  proposes  that  the  Western  identity  is
fundamentally  founded  upon  othering  logic,  one  which
dehumanises  and  devalues  ‘the  other’,  namely  the  ‘primitives’,
‘uncivilised’ and other racialised subjectivities. According to Said,
the  ‘East’  was  reduced  to  simple  typologies  by  and  for  the
‘Westerners’  in  order  to  make  the  ‘East’  more  conceivable.  The
politicisation  of  Islam  in  Western  discourses,  the  deep  suspicion
towards Muslims, and the legitimation of colonialism and violence
against  the  dangerous  Muslim  subject,  originate  from  this
tradition.116 This  story,  which  has  come  ‘true’,  has  tangible
consequences.
Butler  observes  that  the  progressive  history  that  ‘we’  in  the
‘West’  write  for  ourselves  positions  the  ‘Western’  human  as  the
human worth valuing and protecting,  while the Islamic population
is  considered  ‘not  yet  having  arrived  at  the  idea  of  the  rational
human’.117 Interestingly, Butler also discusses torture as a means to
construct the subject of Islam and ‘the Arab mind’. For her, torture
can be understood as a technique of modernisation.118 The tortured
thus becomes that which constitutes the exemplary modern subject
by being its negation, its ‘other’. Torture, then, is not an aberration
114  Toni Morrison, The Bluest Eye (1981) as cited in Chris Weedon, Identity and Culture:
Narratives of Difference and Belonging (Open University Press 2004) 8.
115  Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and ambivalence (Polity Press 1991) 1.
116  Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient (Repr.  with  a  new
afterword edn Penguin Books 1995) 202–208, 284–287; Edward W. Said Orientalismi
(Kati Pitkänen tr, Gaudeamus University Press, Helsinki 2011) 337–341.
117  Judith Butler, ‘Sexual politics, torture, and secular time’ (2008) 59(1) The British
Journal of Sociology 1, 15.
118  Ibid 15–18.
50
of modernity, but an inseparable function of the ‘civilisational
mission’. For Butler, ‘[t]his very process not only justifies, but also
necessitates the rationale of torture of “the other”‘.119
What  does  all  this  mean  for  the  law  and  its  subjects?  The  law
legitimates itself with the claim of justice and equality: the goddess
of justice is  blindfolded so that  she cannot base her judgement on
the characteristics of the person seeking justice. At the same time,
however, the law is infamous for legitimating the ultimate forms of
othering, such as slavery, institutionalised racism, the
discrimination  of  women,  the  disabled,  and  sexual  and  gender
minorities.  Quoting  Nietzsche,  Douzinas  and  Gearey  describe  the
law  as  a  demarcating  force  that  inheres  ‘a  fear  of  the  foreign,
strange,  uncanny,  outlandish’  and  thus  being  ‘defined  by  the
separation it  allows between “us” and “them”’.120 Contrary to what
we  would  like  to  believe,  the  law  is  not  based  on  universal
humanity, nor promotes universal human rights.121
The process of othering discussed in The detainee, the prisoner,
and the refugee and Forever again can be examined within a larger
context of fragmentation of the seemingly unified legal subject.
Contrary to what the law suggests, the legal subject is not unified,
autonomous,  and  does  not  include  everyone.  Evidence  for  the
fragmentation of the legal subject can be traced back all the way to
the history of slavery. Slavery has often been understood as a form
of  total  non-recognition,  with  the  slave  lacking  the  basic
characteristics of personhood.122 However,  Dayan’s  analysis  of  the
genealogy of the Guantanamo detainee and the supermax prisoner
demonstrates that what occupied the lawyers’ minds ‘on the eve of
the  Civil  War  was  not  to  affirm  the  slave  as  property,  but  to
articulate  the  personhood  of  slaves  in  such  a  way  that  it  was
disfigured, not erased’.123
According  to  Dayan,  the  US  government  and  the  courts  are
currently turning living, sentient persons into inanimate, rightless
objects,  and  the  process  is  actually  similar  to  that  of  creating  the
119  Ibid 18–19.
120  Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical jurisprudence: the political philosophy of
justice (Hart Publishing 2005) 52, 60, 286.
121  Colin Dayan, The Law Is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons
(Princeton University Press 2013) 185.
122  See ibid 198.
123  Ibid 140, see also  xiv, 49, 53–54, 60, 65.
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subjectivity of  the slave.  The slave has been ‘reborn in the body of
the prisoner’.124 Dayan argues that the law’s alchemy produces grey
zones  between  the  categories  of  ‘human’,  ‘animal’,  and  ‘thing’.
While these categories are apparently clear-cut, Dayan
demonstrates that they are in fact fragmented and overlapping. Not
only does the law uphold a hierarchical dichotomy between ‘human’
and  ‘animal’,  but  also  between  ‘human’  and  ‘non-human’,  or  ‘less-
than-human’. Similarly, Douzinas and Gearey, albeit from a slightly
different point of view, assert that historically the legal system is
fractured  into  two-tier  practices,  such  as  the  ‘separate  but  equal’
doctrine of the Constitutional Court of the US, and the South-
African apartheid. Similar duality is currently evident in the
manner that the suspected terrorists and refugees are treated.
Douzinas and Gearey describe this duality as ‘the law of colour’. For
them,  the  essential  problem  is  not  that  the  law  discriminates,  but
that it creates two laws according to colour and race.125
The  main  finding  in  the  last  two  articles, The detainee, the
prisoner, and the refugee, and Forever again,  is  that  that  violent
subject production techniques and discursive blame avoidance
strategies relate to the racialised subjectivation of the detainees as
dangerous and undemocratic, thus worthy of only reduced legal
protection. The disturbing conclusion to be drawn from the analysis
is  precisely  the  fragmentation  of  the  human  subject  in  law  –  the
explicit  dichotomies  of  law,  such  as  human/animal,  may  be  clear-
cut, but the category of ‘human’ itself is implicitly fragmented. The
fragmentation of ‘human’ into sub-categories, such as the detainee,
the  prisoner,  and  the  refugee,  allows  the  law  to  treat  ‘us’  humans
differently  according  to  the  way  we  are  subjectified  by  the  law.
Combined with securitisation126 and  the  discourse  of  threat,  the
repercussions of fragmenting the subject and the emergence of the
dangerous individual reproduce law’s discriminatory effects. While
124  Ibid 60, see also  139, 181, 186, 246–247.
125  Costas Douzinas and Adam Gearey, Critical jurisprudence: the political philosophy of
justice (Hart Publishing 2005) 198.
126  Securitisation means turning subjects into matters of security. Successful
securitisation involves designating a threat, which is framed in such a way that it
requires immediate intervention, and thus legitimates the demands for special
measures and determining new priorities. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde,
Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 1998) 21–24,  36;  see also
Neve Gordon, ‘Human Rights as a Security Threat: Lawfare and the Campaign against
Human Rights NGOs’ (2014) 48(2) Law & Society Review 311, 317–318.
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modern criminal law is in principle based on the idea that penal law
has  a  claim  over  an  individual  owing  to  their  past  offences,  Cole
maintains that the notion of legal responsibility can be expanded in
order to allow the authorities to target individuals not for what they
have  done,  but  for  what  they  might  do.  Often,  Cole  argues,  these
predictions rely on skin colour, nationality, or political or religious
affiliations.127
Despite these rather bleak observations, subjectivation is not
primarily a process that imposes subjectivities on us. Rather,
subjectivity is assumed and enacted by the subjects themselves.128
The role of power in subjectivation is therefore two-fold:
subjectivation  is  by  definition  a  process  of  subordination,  but  it  is
also a process that allows the power relationship to be reversed by
the subject assuming the power that created it.129 This allows
subjectivity to be contested and transformed. The powerfulness of
classifications is precisely why resisting them and taking them into
one’s own hands is transformative. As Bauman aptly puts it: ‘[s]ince
the  sovereignty  of  the  modern  state  is  the  power  to  define  and  to
make definitions stick – everything that self-defines or eludes the
power-assisted definition is subversive’.130
Returning  to  the  theories  of  civil  disobedience,  Rosa  Parks  and
those like her are often celebrated as paragon citizens who publicly
address a manifestly  unjust  policy or law in order to communicate
with  their  political  community  and  appeal  to  its  shared  values.
Although Parks may have broken the letter of the law, as the story
goes,  she  remained  faithful  to  the  legal  order  and  in  fact  acted
according to the founding principles of  the community’s  law.  Rosa
Parks’ refusal to give up her seat to white passengers corresponds to
what most theorists would consider as fulfilling the requirements of
civil disobedience. In other words, Park’s action was a public, non-
violent  and  conscientious  act,  which  presumably  engaged  with  the
moral  sentiments  of  her  fellow  citizens.  But  was  Parks’  refusal  to
give  her  seat  to  a  white  passenger  really  simply  about  the
127  David Cole, ‘The New McCarthyism. Repeating History in the War on Terrorism’ in
Austin Sarat (ed.) Dissent in Dangerous Times (University of Michigan Press 2005)
111–145.
128  See e.g Judith Butler, The psychic life of power: theories in subjection (Stanford
University Press 1997) 84–85.
129   Ibid 13, 93.
130  Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and ambivalence (Polity Press 1991) 8.
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discriminatory seat policy? The answer is obviously no. Instead,
Parks  challenged  the  whole  system  of  racial  segregation  and  the
literal  and  symbolic  dividing  of  ‘the  other’  from  ‘us’.  In  fact,  by
refusing to give up her seat, Parks refused to be subjectified as less-
than-white thus dismantling the dichotomy of white/non-white.
When I  combined  the  theorisation  of  disobedience  with  that  of
the  subjectivity  in  my  work,  this  resulted  in  re-thinking  what
disobedience is. Apart from communicating with one’s political
community and expressing deep commitment to that community,
disobedience can be understood as a means of challenging both the
totalising citizen subjectivity and the fragmentation of the human
subject. Generally speaking, the theories of civil disobedience do
not sufficiently recognise the depth of the disobedient act and the
ways it challenges the established hierarchy of subjectivities. At the
heart  of  the  struggle  for  justice,  such  as  the  American  civil  rights
movement  and  the  Gandhian  struggle  for  Indian  independence,  is
the  question  of  subjectivity.  In  other  words,  this  is  a  question  of
who is considered to be a full human subject, and what that subject
is like.
This shift in my understanding of civil disobedience allowed me
to  frame  the  so-called  headscarf  cases  of  the  European  Court  of
Human  Rights  as  civil  disobedience.  The  reason  is  not  that  the
refusal to remove the Islamic headscarf could be described in terms
of  civil  disobedience  –  it  is,  after  all,  public,  non-violent,  non-
revolutionary, and based on moral (religious) beliefs. This line of
thought  would,  however,  soon  lead  to  deliberations  on  the
justifiability  of  the act.  What interests  me instead is  that  like Rosa
Parks, the woman refusing to unveil herself refuses the totalising
subjectivity reserved for her. But whereas we, although
anachronistically, identify with Rosa Parks and perceive her
disobedience as something that promoted the modern idea of
equality, the veiled woman represents just the opposite. Western
identity has been constructed in relation to the perceived
backwardness  of  Islam,  and  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  combine  it
with ‘our’ progressive perception of ourselves.
What  may  be  the  most  threatening,  even  inconceivable,  is
someone  who  refuses  to  take  sides.  This  is  threatening  because  it
exposes the arbitrariness of the dichotomies and therefore unravels
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them altogether.131 In a recent ECtHR case concerning the Islamic
full-face veil ban, S.A.S. v. France, the applicant attempted to
combine modern, autonomous, and free subjectivity with Islam, as
she  identified  herself  both  as  a  modern,  Western  citizen,  and  as  a
devout Muslim. The Court, however, rejected her self-identification
and emphasised the importance of the human face in interpersonal
relations  ‘not  because  it  de  facto  prevents  social  interaction  and
living  together,  but  because  a  veiled  woman  is  perceived  as  “the
other” by the majority’, as I observe elsewhere.132 The  Muslim
woman  wearing  the  headscarf  or  the  full-face  veil  cannot  be
included in ‘us’, because that would erode the distinction between
‘us’  and ‘the other’  and would therefore erode not only ‘the other’,
but ‘us’ as well.
Ultimately, in the headscarf cases, what is weighed and balanced
in the scales of law by the European Court of Human Rights are not
the personal freedoms enshrined in the Convention against the
‘competing interests’ of the society, but the autonomy of the legal
subject  in  relation  to  the  demand  for  loyalty  to  the  state.  The
conflict,  therefore,  lies  not  between  the  personal  and  political  or
individual and society, but within the subjectivity of a citizen who is
supposed  to  be  a  subject  in  both  senses  of  the  word.  This,  in  fact,
relates to the paradox that the theories of civil disobedience
struggle  with:  whether  or  not  one  should  be  an  individual  moral
agent  first  and  foremost,  or  whether  the  duty  to  one’s  community
prevails.  Being  ‘a  good  citizen’  and  ‘a  good  person’  are  sometimes
considered  mutually  exclusive,  because  ‘a  good  person’  insists  on
holding  on  to  their  personal  beliefs  even  at  the  expense  of  the
community to which they belong.133 At the same time, however, an
individual  challenging  the  unjust  rules  of  the  community  is
celebrated as a true citizen.
131  See ibid 56.
132 Kati Nieminen, ‘S.A.S. v. France: Law, Islamophobia and the full-face veil ban’
(Unpublished manuscript 2017).
133  See e.g. Hannah Arendt, Crises of the republic (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1972) 61–
62, 65, 76, 84–85; Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction. The Case for Civil
Disobedience (Oxford University Press 2015); John Rawls, ‘Definition and Justification
of Civil Disobedience’ in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (first
published 1971, Routledge 1991) 103, 107, 114, 120. I believe that the tension between
civil disobedience, celebrated as the ultimate performance of citizenship, and
conscientious objection, regarded as a selfish disengagement with the rules of the
community, derives from this source.
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From the perspective of the law, and from the perspective of civil
disobedience,  hunger  striking  would  be  considered  irrational  and
incomprehensible. The hunger striker does not seem to
communicate in any comprehensible language, and does not even
appear to have a clear message. However, the hunger striker is
perhaps better able than the civil disobedient or the applicant in the
court  of  law to  address  the  problem of  subjectivation.  Perhaps  the
hunger  striker  can  be  best  understood  with  what  Foucault
designates as anti-authority struggles against normalising power.
Anti-authority struggles target the power effects such as the
subjectivation  as  less-than-human,  and  not  simply  the  violent
practices  producing  it.  And  unlike  the  struggles  described  by  the
theories of civil disobedience, anti-authority struggles do not expect
to  find  a  solution,  such  as  revolution,  liberation  or  legal  reforms.
Instead,  ‘[t]hey  are  struggles  that  question  the  status  of  the
individual’,  and  ‘revolve  around  the  question:  Who  are  we?’134
Instead of endeavouring to challenge the techniques of violent
subject production, the hunger striker directly addresses the
problematic subjectivity. In The  detainee,  the  prisoner,  and  the
refugee, I argue that the hunger striker is able to call out the law on
its violence and that the law in unable to address the hunger striker,
who refuses to ‘speak law’. This is a powerful act of resistance that
the law cannot silence.135 However, it is possible to re-interpret the
hunger striker’s protest in legal language by using expressions such
as ‘manipulative self-injurious behavior’ and ‘coordinated efforts to
disrupt camp operations’.136 These words re-introduce hunger
striking  in  legal  terms  and  invite  the  law  to  approach  hunger
striking as a matter of order and security.
134  Michel  Foucault,  ‘The  Subject  and  Power’  in  James  D.  Faubion  (ed.) Power. The
Essential Works of Michel Foucault (Penguin Books 2002) 330–331; see also Samuli
Hurri, Birth of the European individual: law, security, economy (Routledge, 2014)
172.
135  Emilios Christodoulidis and Scott Veitch, ‘The Ignominy of Unredeemed Politics:
Revolutionary Speech as Différend’ (1997) 10 (29) International Journal for the
Semiotics of Law.
136  See Kati Nieminen, ‘The Detainee, the Prisoner, and the Refugee. The Dynamics of




Collective actors involved in civil disobedience invoke the
utopian principles of constitutional democracies, appealing
to  the  ideas  of  fundamental  rights  or  democratic
legitimacy.137
My interest in the theories of civil disobedience does not stem from
the  aim  to  define  the  phenomenon  in  order  to  demarcate  it  from
ordinary crimes, terrorism, protests and other forms of resistance
and  disobedience,  nor  from  the  normative  approach  that  the
theories of civil disobedience tend to adopt. Instead, my initial
interest was rather instrumental, as I was interested in how to
identify cases of  disobedience to examine what the law’s  approach
to  them  reveals  about  the  law  itself.  At  some  point  during  the
process,  I  thought  I  had  lost  the  question  of  civil  disobedience,  or
moved  beyond  it,  as  I  became  interested  in  other  types  of  dissent
and resistance.  However,  I  realised  that  after  taking  a  long  detour
into subjectivation and othering, I did, after all, have something to
contribute to the discussion on civil disobedience and conscientious
objection.  Subjectivity in relation to disobedience was discussed in
the  previous  section.  In  this  section,  I  explore  the  role  of  the
theories of  disobedience in producing the narrative of  ‘us’.  What if
the theories of civil disobedience would be interpreted as stories we
tell ourselves about ourselves?
For  some time  now,  academics  as  well  as  those  in  the  arts  and
entertainment have been challenged by indigenous scholars, artists
and activists with claims of cultural appropriation. Appropriation is
derived from Latin appropriare,  which  means  ‘to  make  one’s
own’.138 This  term  thus  refers  to  taking  and/or  profiting  from  a
culture  that  is  not  one’s  own in  terms  of  adopting  aspects  such  as
cultural  artifacts,  expressions  or  knowledge.  This  concept  is  not
easy  to  grasp,  as  it  is  difficult  to  determine  what  ‘taking’  means.
Questions  also  arise  as  to  what  a  culture  is,  who  belongs  to  that
137  Jean  L.  Cohen  and  Andrew  Arato  (1992)  as  cited  Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Polity Press
1996) 383.
138 Richard A. Rogers, ‘From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and
Reconceptualisation of Cultural Appropriation’ (2006) 16(4) Communication Theory
475.
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culture and what can be taken. 139 These questions are outside of the
scope  of  this  thesis,  but  I  believe  that  despite  its  difficulties,  the
concept  of  appropriation  can  be  used  successfully,  especially  in
exposing the underlying power imbalances in society. In the
following, I observe the phenomenon of appropriating the struggle
of  many  who  are  civil  disobedient  into  the  narrative  of  nation,
democracy  and  citizenship.  This  may  seem  unfair  to  the  scholars
whose work on the theory of civil disobedience has genuinely aimed
at justifying certain forms of illegal action, to facilitate civil protest
and  to  enhance  democracy.  My  intention  is  not  to  thwart  these
efforts. It should also be noted that my conclusions are not based on
an exhaustive analysis, and are therefore vulnerable to criticism due
to selective reading. Despite these weaknesses, my intention is to be
able to provide an alternative perspective on how ‘we’ create
insiders and outsiders in our discourses.
As  Ziff  and  Rao  assert,  the  important  questions  around
(cultural)  appropriation  are  political  and  relate  to  power
relationships.140 The  question  is  when  we  tell  the  story  of  civil
disobedience  as  a  way  to  ‘[reassert]  the  link  between  civil  and
political society’141, whether we are recounting someone else’s story.
Are we appropriating the story of  the subaltern into our own story
so that it silences the subaltern?142 Is it an act of assimilation? The
narrative approach to the theories of civil disobedience can be used
to re-construct  them as stories we tell  ‘ourselves’  about the way in
which ‘we’ came into being and about what ‘we’ think ‘we’ are like.
Scrutinising the political effects of a narrative requires that
storytelling  is  not  understood  merely  as  ‘a  way  of  creating
community but as a resource for dominating others, for expressing
solidarity,  for  resistance  and  conflict;  a  resource  that  is,  in  the
139  Bruce Ziff and Pratima V. Rao, Borrowed power: Essays on cultural appropriation
(Rutgers University Press 1997) 1–5.
140  Ibid 5–7.
141  Jean  L.  Cohen  and  Andrew  Arato  (1992)  as  cited  Habermas, Between Facts and
Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Polity Press,
1996) 383.
142  Spivak has argued that ’[f]or the ”true” subaltern group, whose identity is its
difference, there is no unrepresentable subaltern subject that can know and speak
itself’.  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak,  ‘Can  the  Subaltern  Speak?’  in  Cary  Nelson  &
Lawrence Grossberg (eds.) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (University of
Illinois Press 1988) 285; see also the narrative of imperialism and epistemic violence,
production of history as a narrative; ibid 280–283.
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continuing negotiation through which humans create language and
society  and  self  as  they  talk  and  act’.143 Any  version  of  history  is
quite literally a story that creates the events it claims to describe.144
The contemporary discussion on civil disobedience is roughly
divided into two distinct discourses. The first, the liberal theories of
civil disobedience, are predominantly rights-oriented, perceiving
disobedience as a form of individual, conscientious protest against
governments or political majorities that transgress the community’s
moral values. The second – radical democratic theories – perceive
civil disobedience as a practice of collective self-determination, and
as a counterweight for the unavoidable structural democratic
deficits that are inherent in state institutions.145 Despite their
different approaches,  it  can be claimed that the liberal  and radical
democratic theories of civil disobedience both concentrate
predominantly  on  the  time  defying  question  of  how  and  in  what
circumstances civil disobedience can be justified politically, morally
or legally.
These theories have varying stances on violence, the willingness
to accept legal punishment, and the requirement of publicity of civil
disobedience. What most theories share, however, is their
insistence that in a reasonably just society, civil disobedience must
have a communicative function and illustrate overall fidelity to the
legal  order,  or  at  least  to  the  general  moral  principles  of  the
community.146 As my approach to disobedience is somewhat
different,  it  is  unlikely  that  I  am  able  to  make  a  significant
contribution to this particular debate. Rather, my contribution
concerns the role the theories themselves potentially have in
totalising the citizen subjectivity and in creating the narrative of the
143  Barbara Johnstone, ‘Discourse analysis and narrative’ in Deborah Schiffrin, Deborah
Tannen, and Heidi E. Hamilton (eds.) The handbook of discourse analysis. (Blackwell
2001) 644.
144  See ibid 643, 644–645.
145  Robin Celikates, ‘Democratizing civil disobedience’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social
Criticism 982, 988–989.
146  See Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Introduction' in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil disobedience in
focus (Routledge 1991) 9, 11; John Rawls, ‘Definition and Justification of Civil
Disobedience’ in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (first published
1971, Routledge 1991) 104, 105; Peter Singer, ‘Disobedience as a Plea for
Reconsideration’ in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (first
published 1973, Routledge 1991) 122–129; Henry David Thoreau, ‘Civil Disobedience’
in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (Routledge 1991) 30, 34.
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democratic West. Let us consider the following quote from Rawls in
the light of Rosa Park’s act of disobedience:
It should also be noted that civil disobedience is a political act
not only in the sense that it is addressed to the majority that
holds political power, but also because it is an act guided and
justified by political principles, that is, by the principles of
justice which regulate the constitution and social institutions
generally. In justifying civil disobedience one does not appeal
to principles of personal morality or to religious doctrines […]
Instead it invokes the commonly shared conception of justice
that underlies the political order. It is assumed that in a
reasonably just democratic regime there is a public conception
of justice by reference to which citizens regulate their political
affairs and interpret the constitution. […] By engaging in civil
disobedience a minority forces the majority to consider
whether it wishes to have its actions construed [as being in
persistent and deliberate violation of the basic principles of
this conception], or whether, in view of the common sense of
justice, it wishes to acknowledge the legitimate claims of the
minority.147
What is  the commonly shared sense of  justice that  Rosa Parks can
be  said  to  appeal  to?  It  is,  of  course,  possible  to  reconstruct  an
underlying constitutional principle of equality that prohibits not
only  slavery,  but  racial  segregation  as  well.  On  the  other  hand,
interpreting Tocqueville, Arendt states that a fundamental
weakness of the abolitionist movement in the US was that it was not
able to appeal ‘to the law of the land nor the opinion of the country’,
but instead merely to individual conscience, because there was
nothing in the Constitution or in the intent of its framers that could
have  been  construed  as  to  include  the  slaves  in  the  ‘original
consensus universalis of the American republic’.148 In  fact,  the
emancipation of the slaves was not meant to include them into ‘us’,
but  instead  to  establish  either  racial  segregation,  or  to  deport  the
147  John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 2005) 365–366.
148  Hannah Arendt, Crises of the republic (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 1972) 90; cf.
Frederick  Douglas  as  cited  in  Robert  M.  Cover.  ‘Nomos  and  Narrative’  (1983)  97(4)
Harv L Rev. 38.
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former  slaves  from  the  US  soil.149 Rather than the correct
constitutional interpretation, however, the real question concerns
the purpose of  the insistence on ‘the commonly shared conception
of justice’ in theories of civil disobedience.
The heroes of civil disobedience described in the theories
incorporate  Rosa  Parks  and  other  celebrated  individuals  –
disengaged  from their  supporting  communities  –  into  a  narrative,
within which ‘we’  –the ones whose laws were broken – regain our
dignity.  According  to  the  narrative,  in  a  reasonably  just  society,
there  was  a  law  which  was  misguided  and  contrary  to  the
fundamental principles of the constitution. Fortunately, there was a
brave  individual  who  pointed  this  out  to  their  respective
community, which was then ready and willing to reconsider the law
– and gradually the norms of  the society better  reflected its  moral
sentiments.150 To be fair, there are exceptions to this storyline. For
example, Celikates questions the idea that the celebrated cases of
civil  disobedience,  namely  those  of  Thoreau,  Gandhi  and  King,
appealed to the majority’s sense of justice because in these cases,
‘civil disobedience seems at odds with, and indeed directed against
the majority’s moral sentiments’.151 Singer  goes  even  further  and
argues  that  the  Western  political  systems  are  not  democratic  to
begin  with,  and  that  therefore  the  criteria  for  justifiable  civil
disobedience cannot be applied.152
The majority of scholars, however, seem to take the Western
democracies for granted and insist that justifiable civil disobedience
indicates either fidelity to the law in general, or at least engagement
in rational communication with one’s community and provoking
democratic reflection within it.153 Justifiable civil disobedience is, in
149  Ibid. See also John Rawls, ‘Definition and Justification of Civil Disobedience’ in Hugo
Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (first published 1971, Routledge 1991).
150  See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, ‘On Not Prosecuting Civil Disobedience’ (1968) The New
York Review of Books. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/1968/06/06/on-not-
prosecuting-civil-disobedience/> accessed 12 January 2017; c.f. Herbert J. Storing,
‘The Case Against Civil Disobedience’ in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.) Civil Disobedience in
Focus (Routledge 1991) 85–102.
151  Robin Celikates, ‘Democratizing civil disobedience’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social
Criticism 982,  984–985;  see  also  Hannah  Arendt, Crises of the Republic (Harcourt
Brace Jovanovic 1972) 77; Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (Clarendon
Press 1973) 150.
152  Singer, Peter. Democracy and Disobedience, (Clarendon Press, 1973).
153  See e.g. Kimberley Brownlee, ‘The Civil Disobedience of Edward Snowden: A reply to
William Schauerman’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy and Social Criticism 965, 968; Maeve
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fact, regarded as a function of true democracy, ultimately
demonstrating the commitment of the disobedient to their political
communities:
[T]he justification of civil disobedience relies on a dynamic
understanding of the constitution as an unfinished project.
From this long-term perspective, the constitutional state does
not represent a finished structure but a delicate and sensitive
– above all fallible and revisable – enterprise, whose purpose
is to realize the system of rights anew in changing
circumstances, that is, to interpret the system of rights better,
to institutionalize it more appropriately, and to draw out its
contents more radically. This is the perspective of citizens who
are actively engaged in realising the system of rights.154
The above description of democracy is, of course, desirable.
However,  appropriating  the  stories  of  Rosa  Parks  and  others  who
are  disobedient  into  this  narrative,  makes  ‘our’  failure  to  deliver
justice  invisible.  Instead,  the  onus  is  on  the  disobedient  to
demonstrate loyalty to the political community and its fundamental
values.  In  fact,  the  motives  of  the  disobedient  seem  to  be
disproportionately emphasised in the theories of civil disobedience:
[T]o be justified in civilly disobeying, we must have a good
cause, a good set of motivations, and a suitably constrained
set of practices with modest consequences […].155
I hold that the civility of civil disobedience lies not in the non-
violence, publicity, or willingness to accept punishment, but in
the conscientious, communicative motivations of civil
disobedients. Civil disobedience involves not just a
communicative breach, but a conscientious communicative
Cooke, ‘Civil obedience and disobedience’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social Criticism
995, 1000; William E. Schauerman. ‘What Edward Snowden can teach theorists of
conscientious law-breaking’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social Criticism 958, 961.
154  Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of
Law and Democracy (Polity Press 1996) 384. Emphasis original.
155  Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction. The Case for Civil Disobedience
(Oxford University Press 2015), 8. Emphasis original.
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breach of law motivated by steadfast, sincere, and serious,
though possibly mistaken, moral commitment.156
But  why  do  we  need  to  know  and  assess  Rosa  Parks’  motives  for
disobeying  the  bus  driver  in  order  to  recognise  the  value  of  her
action? Does it matter whether she acted out of deeply held, sincere
conviction  or  sudden  frustration,  even  anger?  Does  the  notion  of
the rational citizen and the preconditions for justifiable
disobedience,  and  particularly  the  insistence  on  appealing  to  the
moral  values of  the community,  blind us to the profound question
posed by the disobedient for society? In the quotation from Singer
below, the disobedient act is domesticated to the extent that if the
majority refuses to engage with the disobedient’s  plea,  ‘this  sort  of
disobedience must be abandoned’:
A form of disobedience […] aims, not at presenting a view to
the public, but at prodding the majority into reconsidering a
decision it has taken. A majority may act, or fail to act, without
realising that there are truly significant issues at stake, or the
majority may not have considered the interests of all parties,
and its decision may cause suffering in a way that was not
foreseen. […] Disobedience which aims to make the majority
reconsider in this way is not an attempt to coerce them, and
within limits broadly similar to those just discussed in
connection with disobedience for publicity, it is compatible
with acceptance of a fair compromise as a means of settling
issues. Once it becomes apparent that the majority are not
willing to reconsider, however, this sort of disobedience must
be abandoned.157
The theories of disobedience seem to be preoccupied with
preserving  the  notion  of  community,  of  ‘us’,  to  an  extent  that  it
appears to be at least a central part of the theories as pondering the
justifiability of disobedience and its role in democracy. Perhaps the
theories  of  civil  disobedience  contribute  as  much  in  constructing
‘us’, a community of ideal citizens, and in re-producing the story of
156  Ibid 23–24. Emphasis original.
157  Peter Singer, ‘Disobedience as a Plea for Reconsideration’ in Hugo Adam Bedau (ed.)
Civil Disobedience in Focus (Routledge 1991).
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democratic  West,  as  they  do  for  mapping  the  limits  of  democratic
action.  The  autonomous  citizens,  who  are  committed  to  their
respective  communities,  and  whose  behaviour  is  rational  and
predictable, are needed in order to legitimate the sovereign rule.158
Do the theories of civil disobedience then (re)produce the citizen in
a way that  is  predictable and controllable? Perhaps the theories of
civil disobedience would be best understood as another story we tell
ourselves about ourselves: a story of a reasonably just and
democratic society, and of rational, autonomous citizens, who share
a certain set of values and moral principles.
Regarding othering, my question is whether the theories of civil
disobedience endorse the language of  belonging that  paints a  false
picture  of  a  community  of  autonomous  and  rational  people  with  a
shared set of fundamental values that enable them to agree on some
basic  principles  enshrined  in  the  democratic  order.  Is  it  not
disingenuous  to  foster  a  narrative  of  ‘us’  and  belonging  in  the
context  of  the struggle of  the civil  rights movements against  racial
discrimination – to celebrate the civil disobedients as ‘true citizens’
who  ‘exemplify  what  it  means  to  be  a  citizen  in  reasserting  their
political agency against politically entrenched and often
invisibilised forms of domination, exclusion, or marginalisation’?159
My critique  here  is  not  directed  against  the  brave  individuals  who
have  challenged  unjust  regimes,  nor  is  it  my  aim to  downplay  the
changes  they  have  initiated  or  their  belonging  in  ‘us’.  Instead,  I
want  to  examine  critically  the  ways  in  which  these  individuals  are
singled out, segregated from their support groups, and celebrated
as  one  of  ‘us’  in  many  theories  of  civil  disobedience,  instead  of
recognising their struggles as ‘the other’.
The  question  of  belonging  is  interesting  if  one  reads  Martin
Luther  King’s  Letter  from Birmingham City  jail  in  the  light  of  ‘us’
and  ‘the  other’.  King’s  letter  addresses  his  ‘fellow clergymen’,  who
had  called  the  protests  of  the  civil  rights  movement  ‘unwise  and
untimely’,  in  an  attempt  to  explain  the  rationale  behind  direct
158  See Michel  Foucault,  ‘The Subject  and Power’  in James D.  Faubion (ed.) Power. The
Essential Works of Michel Foucault (Penguin Books 2002) 326; Samuli Hurri, Birth of
the European individual: law, security, economy (Routledge 2014) 161–172.
159  Robin Celikates, ‘Democratizing civil disobedience’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social
Criticism 982, 985–986.
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action  and  to  persuade  the  ‘white  moderate’.160According to King,
non-violent direct action has four steps: 1) determining whether
injustice is alive 2) negotiation, 3) self-purification (such as
workshops on non-violence), and 4) direct action. The aim of direct
action is to re-engage the respective community in negotiation.161
Thus,  King  does  address  his  own political  community.  Yet  he  also
emphasises the gulf between the everyday experiences of ‘the
negroes’ and ‘those who have never felt the stinging darts of
segregation’, and who have not witnessed ‘vicious mobs lynch your
mothers and fathers at will and drown your sisters and brothers at a
whim’.162  Thus,  belonging  in  King’s  letter  is  unstable  –  he  does
include  himself  and  other  civil  rights  protesters  in  ‘us’,  but  he
constructs a divide between the privileged white population and the
oppressed  black  minority.  Highlighting  only  the  former  aspect  of
the struggle silences the painful experiences of the civil rights
activists  as ‘the other’.  In order to better  understand the injustices
of  the  present,  we  need  to  fully  acknowledge  the  injustices  of  the
past.
Understood within the context of social contract theories, the
theories  of  civil  disobedience  can  be  perceived  as  part  of  the
foundational narratives that legitimate the normative status of a
given legal system.163 The  justification  of  civil  disobedience  is
usually  bound  to  the  idea  that  the  obligation  to  obey  the  law,
derived from the social contract, is a given, and the justification of
civil disobedience, if there is any, is derived from a potential breach
of  that  contract.  Interpreted  in  this  way,  civil  disobedience  is  not
actually a problem for the social contract theory – on the contrary.
From the perspective of justifying civil disobedience, this may be a
plausible starting point. However, from a perspective that is critical
of all-embracing and appropriating master narratives, it seems that
in  the  context  of  social  contract  theories,  civil  disobedience  is  a
rather diluted form of protest.
160  Martin Luther King Junior, ‘A Letter from Birmingham City Jail’, in Hugo Adam Bedau
(ed.) Civil Disobedience in Focus (first published 1963, Routledge 1991) 68–84 1963.
161  Ibid 70–71.
162  Ibid 73.
163  Greta Olsson, ‘Narration and Narrative in Legal Discourse’ The Living handbook of
narratology (17 January 2014) http://www.lhn.uni-hamburg.de/article/narration-
and-narrative-legal-discourse accessed 5 July 2017.
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The  master  narrative  of  law  is  that  it  is  ‘ours’  in  that  the  law-
giver and the ones it addresses are the same. This notion has been
challenged by Lyotard, who reminds us that the ‘”we” who gives the
law is not identical with the “we” who receive it’.164 Christodoulidis
and  Veitch  argue,  following  Lyotard,  that  this  casts  a  shadow  of
doubt on law, as the law’s legitimacy is generally thought to derive
from the sovereign, unified people.165 Citing Benhabib,
Christodoulidis and Veitch point out the homogenising effects of
creating  ‘the  people’  and  ‘consensus’  wherein  the  legitimacy  of  the
law is derived from.166 Regarding the theories of civil disobedience,
it  can be claimed that for as long as the civil  rights activists  in the
US officially remained ‘the other’ – before the adoption of the Civil
Rights Act – they  were  subjected  to  the  ‘logic  of  identity’  which
‘does violence to those whose otherness places them beyond the
homogenising  logic  of  the  “we”’.167 However,  on  the  other  hand,
they may not become visible and audible in their difference even
after being successful in being recognised as citizens. They may still
be ‘those who are spoken about’ instead of ‘those who speak’.168
In  a  society  where  the  whole  idea  of  slavery  and  racial
segregation seem outrageous, it is easy to celebrate Rosa Parks and
to  identify  with  her.  Temporal  distance  allows  us  to  create  a
narrative of an inevitable progression of human rights and to place
ourselves  in  that  narrative  on  the  side  of  the  virtuous.  The
164  Jean-François Lyotard (1988) as cited in Emilios Christodoulidis and Scott Veitch,
‘The Ignominy of Unredeemed Politics: Revolutionary Speech as Différend’ (1997)
10(29) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 145.
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2007) 2–11, 16–18, 25, 47, 161, 162, 187,  195–201; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can
the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg (eds.) Marxism and the
Interpretation of Culture (University  of  Illinois  Press  1988); Carl F. Stychin,
Governing sexuality: The changing politics of citizenship and law reform (Hart 2003)
3–4, 7, 12–14, 19–22, 36, 41, 54–56, 86.
66
contemporary  examples  of  civil  disobedience,  such  as  the
disclosures by Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning, challenge us
to reflect  once again on what ‘we’  has become. But why does their
conduct seem so much more controversial  than the struggle of  the
civil rights activists? Is it because we are not certain whether or not
we want to identify with these contemporary dissidents, whether or
not  history  will  celebrate  them  as  paragon  citizens,  just  like  Rosa
Parks?
Edward  Snowden was  a  CIA systems  administrator  who  leaked
classified information about NSA programmes to the Guardian and
Washington Post.  Some  theorists  consider  Snowden’s  action  to
fulfil the criteria for civil disobedience: non-evasiveness, dialogic
effort,  and  overall  fidelity  to  the  law.169 What  does  this  type  of
approach contribute to the discussion of disobedient acts beyond
their moral – or even legal – assessment? Does it open our eyes to
something  that  is  wrong  in  our  societies?  Or  does  it,  in  fact,  re-
direct  the  discussion  from  that  wrong  back  to  the  disobedient
person  and  their  motives?  Is  it  necessary  that  the  disobedient
person is  someone we can admire and identify with in order to be
able  to  appreciate  what  they  compel  us  to  see?  Sarat  explains  our
ambiguous attitude toward the disobedient. As the theorists of civil
disobedience, he also emphasises that while the dissenters resist the
prevailing orthodoxy, they nonetheless remain engaged with it. Due
to this liminality, the dissenters are often simultaneously celebrated
as paragon citizens and accused of disloyalty.170 The ambiguity
towards disobedience and dissent in general is perfectly illustrated
by  attitudes  towards  whistleblowers  such  as  Snowden.  While  they
are  welcomed  as  guardians  of  the  community’s  shared  values,  in
practice,  they face serious charges of  high treason and accusations
of colluding with terrorists.171 In  our  eagerness  to  define  civil
169  Kimberley Brownlee, ‘The Civil Disobedience of Edward Snowden: A reply to William
Schauerman’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy and Social Criticism 965–970;  William  E.
Schauerman, ‘What Edward Snowden can teach theorists of conscientious law-
breaking’ (2016) 42(10) Philosophy & Social Criticism 958–964.
170   Wendy Brown, ‘Political Idealization & Its Discontents’ in Austin Sarat (ed.) Dissent in
Dangerous Times (University of Michigan Press 2005) 23–24; Austin Sarat,
‘Terrorism, Dissent, and Repression. An Introduction’ in Austin Sarat (ed.) Dissent in
Dangerous Times (University of Michigan Press 2005) 1–19.
171  See Elletta Sangrey Callahan, ‘Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and U.S. approaches
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disobedience and whistleblowing in a way that by definition renders
them justifiable and even desirable, what do we miss?
tale of reform versus power’ (2007) 76(1) University of Cincinnati Law Review 183;
Austin Sarat, 'Terrorism, Dissent, and Repression. An Introduction' in Austin Sarat
(ed.) Dissent in dangerous times (University of Michigan Press 2005) 7.
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5. FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGICAL
CONTRIBUTION
No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from
the  narratives  that  locate  it  and  give  it  meaning.  […]  Once
understood  in  the  context  of  the  narratives  that  give  it
meaning,  law  becomes  not  merely  a  system  of  rules  to  be
observed, but a world in which we live.172
In  1928,  the  Supreme Court  of  Canada  considered  the  meaning  of
the  word  ‘persons’  in  section  24  of  the  British  North  America  Act,
which provided that the Governor General shall ’summon qualified
persons  to  the  Senate’.  Despite  the  gender-neutral  language  of  the
law,  no  woman had  ever  been  summoned to  become a  member  of
the  Senate.  The  Supreme  Court  decided  that  ‘persons’  did  not
include women, but that decision was reversed the following year by
the Privy Council, making women eligible to participate in public
life.173 Naffine explains that ‘what had changed in the 60 years over
which the “persons” cases were fought was not the legal meaning of
the  word  “persons”  nor  the  chain  of  cases  by  which  it  was
interpreted. […] By the late 1920s, the highest court in the land was
committed  to  a  different  view  of  women  and  their  place  in  public
life.’174
The above example illustrates the central premise of this thesis
that the law operates with categories that are not natural, but
constructed.  This  is  a  question  that  concerns  the  role  of  legal
methodology  and  the  ways  in  which  the  law  along  with  the  ‘legal
insiders’ are relieved of ‘accountability for (unjust) decisions’.175
The  legal  method  ‘defines  its  own  boundaries,  which  means  that
172  Robert M. Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97(4) Harv L Rev 4–5.
173  Mary Jane Mossman, 'Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes' (1986) 3
Australian Journal of Law and Society 30, 33.
174  Ngaire Naffine, Law and the Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence. (Allen &
Unwin, 1990) 42.
175  Ibid 44.
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those  questions  that  fall  inside  the  defined  boundaries  can  be
addressed, but those outside the boundaries are not “legal”
issues’.176 Law’s irresponsibility, then, results partially from the way
in which the law itself is defined, and from the way in which some
things  are  allowed  within  the  law,  and  some  excluded  from  its
reach.177
Another point is that the categories created in the legal practices
and the meaning attributed to them extend their effect beyond the
legal  –  they  contribute  to  how  we  perceive  reality.  This  claim,  in
itself, is not ground-breaking, as it simply reiterates the starting
point  of  social  constructionism:  that  there  is  no  essence  to
conscientious objection, Islam, the state, the citizen or indeed, the
law. That said, my intention is that my articles will contribute to the
methodology  of  socio-legal  research,  and  especially  to  the  critical
study of  legal  argumentation developed by scholars such as Martti
Koskenniemi, and to the discursive approaches to law. My analysis
on meaning making shows how meaning is made in the law either
discursively or in other practices, and is intended to reveal both the
steps  that  any  court  of  law  and  the  legal  scholar  engaging  with
doctrinal research must take before being able to deduce the
outcome and present it in the format of logical deduction as well as
how  power  is  exercised  in  and  through  the  law.  The  aim  is  not,
however, to create a comprehensive theory of legal meaning
making.  Instead,  the  idea  is  to  make  inquiries  into  legal  meaning
making, and to develop methodologic tools for analysing it.
My research draws from social constructionism and discourse
analysis, and demonstrates the idea that ‘what the law does’
depends on how we understand the law itself. The law is replete
with  narratives:  the  courts  of  law  can  be  understood  as  sites  of
competing  narratives;  the  way  in  which  the  legal  norms  are
interpreted and developed, the court’s interpretation of the context
of the relevant events of the case at hand, and even the legitimation
story  –  the  origins  story  of  the  law  –  can  be  understood  as  a
narrative.  The  law,  however,  attempts  to  conceal  its  storytelling
qualities  in order to preserve the illusion of  the law’s  autonomy in
176  Ibid 42.
177  Mary Jane Mossman, 'Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference It Makes' (1986) 3
Australian  Journal  of  Law  and  Society 30, 44—45; Ngaire Naffine, Law and the
Sexes: Explorations in Feminist Jurisprudence. (Allen & Unwin 1990) 44—45.
71
relation to other disciplines and spheres, and the idea that the law
deals exclusively with abstract norms and logical reasoning.
Uncovering the law’s narratives is therefore a useful way to examine
how the law actually works in the world.178
Critical  studies,  including  critical  legal  studies,  have  adopted
narrative  approaches  to  reveal  the  power  relations  that  the
dominant narratives often reproduce. An important question
pertains  to  what  can  and  cannot  be  said  in  a  framework  of  a
particular story – not only what is or is not said, but what can and
cannot be said.179 I have suggested that the legal language blurs the
political protest of the disobedient beyond recognition.
Christodoulidis and Veitch make similar observations and state that
in order to be heard,  the ‘revolutionary’  must ‘accept the language
of the tribunal’ or vanish.180 On the other hand, I have argued that it
is possible to address the law’s violence without directly addressing
the law itself and this is exemplified through hunger striking.
Throughout  this  thesis,  I  argue  that  the  law  constructs
subjectivities in a way that does not follow the narrative of a
universal legal subject. The universal, autonomous and rational
subject  of  law  has  been  challenged  by  the  critical  legal  scholars,
particularly  by  the  feminist  approaches  to  law.  The  vulnerable
subject has been suggested as the replacement for the liberal
subject. The vulnerable subject, capturing the bodily vulnerability of
the human being, would arguably be ‘more representative of actual
lived experience and the human condition’, which would inevitably
affect our thinking on equality and the role of the state in protecting
the vulnerable subject.181 But what about those whose subjectivity is
178  Peter Brooks, ‘Narrative in and of the Law’ in James Phelan and Peter J. Rabinowitz
(eds.) A Companion to Narrative Theory (Blackwell Publishing 2005); Robert M.
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accessed 5 July 2017.
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(1997) 10 (29) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 156.
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made  vulnerable  in  and  through  the  law?  My  approach  addresses
this awkward question.
In this introduction, I have introduced the theoretical
framework,  methodology and overall  arguments of  this  thesis.  The
overall  contribution  of  the  research  articles  can  be  summarized  as
follows: first, my analysis shows how the unified citizen subject
(‘us’)  is  produced  and  second,  it  shows  how  the  human  subject  in
law  is  fragmented  and  violence  legitimated  against  ‘the  other’.
Lastly, I have taken the common themes discussed in the articles –
the  law,  the  subject,  and  disobedience  –  further,  and  tested  the
potential of the narrative approach on theories of civil disobedience,
and particularly (cultural) appropriation as a critical framework for
analysis. While narrativity is an established approach to law,
cultural  appropriation  in  the  legal  narratives  is  a  less  discussed
aspect. My brief inquiry above into the theories of civil disobedience
suggest that what they cannot express is the profound and ongoing
injustice ‘the other’ struggles with, and that the silences they create
can be perceived through the concept of (cultural) appropriation.
Moreover,  I  argued  that  the  connection  the  theories  of  civil
disobedience have to the social contract theories provide an
interesting perspective on the ways in which the legitimation of the
legal system homogenises ‘the people’ and assimilates the deviating
voices.
The second part of this thesis consist of the five previously
published articles. Writing a thesis as a collection of articles, some
of which have been written relatively early on in the process,
provides the reader with visible traces of the development of
personal thought and the process of professional growth. I am sure
my reader will detect inconsistencies and gaps in what is presented
in  the  introduction  on  the  one  hand,  and  what  they  find  in  the
articles on the other. This, I suppose, is to some extent inevitable in
this  format.  However,  I  hope  that  the  discrepancies  can  be
perceived  as  a  development  in  my  thinking  rather  than  as
something detrimental to the project.
The  central  question  in  the  articles  is how rather than why or
whether. While the notion that the law is not neutral is by no means
an innovation,  it  is  important to ask how the law’s  creations come
into being. I ask how subjectivity and othering are produced in legal
practices, and how discursive choices (re)produce the good citizen
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on the one hand, and contribute to othering and the fragmentation
of  the  human  subject  in  law  on  the  other.  Unfortunately,  the
topicality of the refugee situation in Europe, the so-called enhanced
interrogation techniques, and the silencing of minority voices, all
persist. Asking the question how is  important,  as  this  may
contribute  to  raising  awareness  and  our  ability  to  re-imagine  and
reformulate matters. Asking how does not, however, directly
contribute to change, as the aim is not to propose strategies for
improvement. The purpose here is not to proceed to this stage, as
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